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Divine Vengeance and Revenge Tragedy in Renaissance England: *The Spanish Tragedy*, *Hamlet* and *Duchess Of Malfi*[1]

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to examine the rhetoric of the revenge tragedy plot in the English Renaissance, a period of transition to the modern era, as a reaction to the tension existing between the humanist emphasis on agency and grand human potentials in pursuit of virtue and justice, and the Law as manifest in the socio-legal practices and theological discourse of the time. Based mostly on Thomas Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy* (1589) and also referring to William Shakespeare's *Hamlet* and John Webster's *The Duchess of Malfi*, I want to suggest that revenge tragedies of the period propound the Christian teaching of patience as opposed to private revenge which is seen as a proud act of human interference with eternal justice. Although the individual is precluded from pursuing justice by violating either religious or secular law when it seems not to be functioning, the broken order and human faith in justice is restored by a demonstration of how divine retaliation operates through God's providence to which humans become only instrumental as well as the catastrophic consequences of individual attempts at taking revenge.

Keywords: revenge tragedy, divine vengeance, Law, *The Spanish Tragedy*, *Hamlet*, *The Duchess of Malfi*

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Rönesans İngiltere'sinde İlahi Öç ve İntikam Trajedisi: *İspanyol Trajedisi*, Hamlet ve *Malfi Düşesi*

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Özet

Bu makalenin amacı modern çağa bir geçiş dönemi olan İngiltere Rönesansı sırasında yazılmış intikam trajedilerinin kurgularının içerdiği retoriği, bir yanda humanizmanın insan ediminin özgürlüğü ile erdem ve adalet arayışı hizmetindeki büyük insan potansiyeli, diğer yanda dönemin sosyal hukuki uygulamaları ile dini söylemi arasındaki gerilime bir tepki olarak incelemektir. Çoğunlukla dönemin ilk intikam trajedisi olarak kabul edilen ve türe örnek teşkil etmiş Thomas Kyd'in *İspanyol Trajedisi* (1589) üzerinde yoğunlaşırken, William Shakespeare'in *Hamlet* ve John Webster'in *Malfi Düşesi* trajedilerine de değinerek, dönemin intikam trajedilerinde tanrısal adalete mağrur bir müdahale girişimi olarak görülen bireysel intikamdan ziyade sabra dayalı Hristiyan öğretisinin öne çıkarıldığı öne sürülecektir. Bireyin işlevini yitirmiş gibi görünse de dini ve dünyasal yasayı ihlal ederek adalet araması yasaklanırken, bozulan düzen ve insanın adalete olan inancı, ilahi öcün insanların ancak aracı olduğu ilahi takdir aracılığıyla nasıl alındığının ve bireysel intikam eylemlerinin korkunç sonuçlarının ortaya koyulması ile tekrar tahsis edilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: intikam trajedisi, ilahi öç, Yasa, *İspanyol Trajedisi*, *Hamlet*, *Malfi Düşesi*

Tragedy has attracted philosophical attention since its emergence in antiquity due to its depiction of the plight of individuals in a universe beyond their control. It centers around the confrontation of the tragic hero with a dilemma to which s/he is required to respond in action. The tragic hero must decide between two conflicting claims to righteousness; s/he is to take an ethical stance to which there will be repercussions. In the long history of tragedy, the nature of the dilemma which constitute the backbone of the tragic action as well as the ethical choices available to the tragic hero, if any, have changed significantly; yet, what remained a constant is the representation of suffering individuals who find themselves frustrated by forces larger than or beyond themselves such as fate, divine providence, and state authority.

In relation to tragedy, Schopenhauer wrote:

> … the goal of this highest of poetic achievements is the portrayal of the terrible aspect of life, that the unspeakable pain, the misery of humanity, the triumph of wickedness, the scornful domination of chance, and the hopeless fall of the righteous and the innocent are brought before us here: for here we find a significant intimation as to the nature of the world and of existence.[2]

That is to say, tragedy foregrounds issues of free will, meaning of existence, law and justice, as well as evil, condensed at a moment of crisis. Law, with its various manifestations through social institutions such as the family, state, and religion, is aimed to give coherence to life whereas the individual is confronted with its failure to do so.

Hegel distinguishes classical tragedy from modern tragedy, the beginnings of which he sees in the Renaissance, arguing that the former displays an ethical confrontation with two orders of law, religious or secular, for which Sophocles' Antigone is a great case in point, whereas the latter is more concerned with the individual's desire and freedom with respect to the law:

> The heroes of ancient classical tragedy encounter situations in which, if they firmly decide in favor of the one ethical pathos that alone suits their finished character, they must necessarily come into conflict with the equally justified ethical power that confronts them. Modern characters, on the other hand, stand in a wealth of more accidental circumstances, within which one could act this way or that, so that the conflict which is,

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[2] Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation: Volume I.* trans. & ed. by Judith Norman, Alistair Welchman and Christopher Janaway. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 280-1.

> though occasioned by external preconditions, still essentially grounded in the character.[3]

In other words, the aforementioned dilemma challenging the tragic hero is to be found not external to the tragic hero but within the self, though s/he may still be acting under the influence of forces beyond his control, starting with the Early Modern period. In any case, tragedy ensues following a transgression of the law and disruption of the natural order of things, and is resolved by its restoration – until at least the whole notion of "the tragic" has been radically altered in the 20th century. If, in this more classical understanding of tragedy, law and order is eventually restored, which should be considered a happy ending from a more general perspective, and of the community, and no tragedy, it follows that the tragedy in question concerns the subject of the transgression, the tragic hero, whether s/he be acting upon an ethical pathos or individual desire. In that sense, tragedy is an account of a confrontation with the law, and modern tragedy is the tragedy of desire in this confrontation. Modern characters act upon their own will and interest to assert human freedom at the face of the world which is not "just" in its proscription of an authentic identity and demand for subordination to its law.

Revenge tragedies of both ancients and Renaissance playwrights, who engaged in a dialogue with the models of their predecessors, concerns itself particularly with the confrontation of the subject with the Law, its sustenance and failure, in more literal terms. As a concept, revenge is closely associated with the notion of justice. In his article on revenge tragedy, Ronald Broude reminds us that the Renaissance meaning of revenge was more extended and closer to retribution in the modern sense. For the Elizabethans, revenge was not simply a matter of personal retaliation for justice but more of retribution for an offence committed against an individual, family, the state or God.[4] Since retribution connotes that the hurt or harm inflicted in revenge is "morally right and fully deserved", it follows that revenge in Renaissance drama is a response to having been unjustly treated and a pursuit of justice. My aim in this article is to examine the rhetoric of the revenge tragedy plot in the English Renaissance, a period of transition to the modern era, as a reaction to the tension existing between the humanist emphasis on agency and grand human potentials in pursuit of virtue and justice, and the Law as manifest in the socio-legal practices and theological discourse of the time. Based mostly on Thomas Kyd's

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[3] G.W.F. Hegel, *Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art.* Trans. T. M. Knox. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988).

[4] Ronald Broude, "Revenge and Revenge Tragedy in Renaissance England". *Renaissance Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Spring, 1975): 41-42, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2860421.

The Spanish Tragedy (1589) and also referring to William Shakespeare's *Hamlet* and John Webster's *The Duchess of Malfi*, I want to suggest that revenge tragedies of the period propound the Christian teaching of patience as opposed to private revenge which is seen as a proud act of human interference with eternal justice. Although the individual is precluded from pursuing justice by violating either religious or secular law when it seems not to be functioning, the broken order and human faith in justice is restored by a demonstration of how divine retaliation operates through God's providence to which humans become only instrumental as well as the catastrophic consequences of individual attempts at taking revenge.

"Revenge tragedy" is a term first used by A. H. Thorndike at the turn of the century to refer retrospectively to a group of Elizabethan and Jacobean tragedies in which the main action rests on the desire to avenge a secret crime.[5] The popularity of revenge tragedies during the English Renaissance was due to not only their exciting plots abound with bloody and criminal action as spectacle but also the prevalence of revenge as an important issue in everyday experience, socio-legal practices and religious discourse of the time. Vendetta had been a common means of exacting justice for centuries and continued to be so even after a law forbidding blood revenge was established in King Edward I's reign.[6] People sought revenge privately on the basis of religion, honor, blood, and civil duty.[7] Tudor monarchs adopted a stricter attitude and forbid private revenge, punishing avengers severely. Their claim on the right to prohibit revenge regardless of any "justifiable" cause rested on their divine right. Hence, not only as the head of state but also as the head of Church, which manifestly condemned revenge, Tudor government claimed monopoly over "private", "public" and "divine" vengeance through centralized state. Nevertheless, local practices of seeking vengeance in the smaller self-governing units persisted despite severe punishments. In order to obliterate such attempts, moralist and theological teaching against private revenge proliferated during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Broude points out that in Christian teaching, "[t]he good Christian was expected to suffer with resignation all injury to himself, and to remain impervious to the promptings of

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[5] A. H. Thorndike , "The Relations of Hamlet to Contemporary Revenge Plays". *PMLA*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1902): 125-220.

[6] See Fredson Bowers' *Elizabethan Revenge Tragedy, 1587-1642* for a more detailed discussion of pre-Tudor practices of blood feud and duel.

[7] A period of transition, Renaissance England abound with conflicting arguments on revenge. See Lily Bess Campbell's "Theories of Revenge in Renaissance England" and Ronald Broude's article "Revenge and Revenge Tragedy in Renaissance England" for a detailed discussion of socio-legal and religious arguments on revenge.

hatred, anger, and self-interest".[8] This understanding rested primarily on the faith in divine providence.

Renaissance playwrights were interested in the theme of revenge not only for its being a central issue in socio-legal and religious terms but also for their interest in understanding human passions. Instigated by strong emotions such as anger, hatred or grief, revenge plots provided the playwright with the opportunity to explore the complex web of human faculties. Consequently, revenge tragedies written during the English Renaissance abound with manifestations of vengeful desire by characters that find themselves obliged to act to retaliate for what they believe to be an injustice. Seneca, whose work was translated into English between 1559 and 1581, was the literary inspiration for the form, and Thomas Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy* (1589) is the first example containing the basic elements of revenge tragedy. Seneca's tragedies were considered to have little dramatic worth due to their limited development of character and poor handling of its themes. Nevertheless, his melodramatic plots and his take over the Stoic doctrine of passions, especially anger as the strongest passion, was a major influence on revenge tragedy in general, and particularly on Thomas Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy*.

The earliest example of revenge tragedy in English Renaissance drama, Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy* sets a pattern the basic elements of which were followed by playwrights after him. This conventionalized formula involves a secret crime which the criminal devises intricate and even immoral strategies to conceal. However, his efforts only fail him, and more is revealed than concealed owing to fate, which is tantamount to divine providence for the audience of the time. The revenger is usually not the direct victim of the injury but feels obliged to take on the responsibility of exacting justice for the crime with various motivations. The presence of a ghost and use of a play within the play structure to reveal the crime are among the other common elements of Kydian formula. In view of the strong attitude against revenge during Tudor and Stuart reigns of the Renaissance, it close examination of the text and plot structure allows us to see how Thomas Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy* foregrounds divine vengeance as the more legitimate means of instituting justice rather than the individual attempts at exacting revenge when the state power fails to do so.

The play's intricately contrived causal plot structure constitutes the basis for a rhetoric that supports the belief in a grand divine design preordaining the course of events. The opening dialogue between Andrea and the spirit of Revenge, who will be present on stage throughout, acting as a chorus, immediately establishes the theme of injustice and the disrupted order from which tragedy will ensue. Andrea gives an account of his death, and bemoans his unjust and untimely death. When his ghost appears before Pluto, the god of

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[8]   Broude, "Revenge", 51.

the underworld, he is permitted to return to earth, accompanied by the spirit of Revenge, to see vengeance taken on his murderer, Balthazar. This is not, however, the only revenge that will be sought in the play: Hieronimo, whose son Horatio is also mercilessly killed as a result of a plot by Andrea's murderer Balthazar and his accomplice Lorenzo, is distraught when he finds his son's dead body, and vows to avenge for the murder. The more Lorenzo tries to conceal his crime, the bloodier a murderer he becomes, scheming the deaths of those involved in the murder. Nevertheless, all these endeavors prove useless, as is usually the case in a revenge tragedy, and Hieronimo discovers the truth about his son's death. Hieronimo finds the opportunity to ask for help from Bel-Imperia, formerly Andrea's and after his death Horatia's lover, in a plan to take their double revenge. Given the responsibility over the entertainment for the, Hieronimo devises a play, a tragedy, to be acted by himself, Lorenzo, Balthazar and Bel-Imperia, during the marriage ceremony of the latter two. The tragedy covertly reiterates the events that lead to Horatio's death, and serves the purpose of punishing those responsible for the unjust deaths so far in the play. During the performance, Hieronimo stabs Lorenzo, Bel-Imperia kills Balthazar and then herself as if as part of the play. At the end of the play, Hieronimo drags out Horatio's dead body onto the stage, and explains to his royal audience that the killings in the play were real together with their reason. Before he attempts to kill himself, the king asks him to be caught and made to confess his conspirators. During the confusion, Hieronimo first bites off his tongue, then finds an opportunity to stab the Duke of Castile and commits suicide. Thus, Andrea's ghost, who has been witnessing the events with the spirit of Revenge since the beginning, receives full satisfaction for his untimely and unjust death.

Andrea's story and his visit to the world with the spirit of revenge frames the action of the play, and their comments at the beginning, and at the end of each act elaborate on the conceptualization of revenge intended by the playwright. Throughout the play, the murders of two noble soldiers, Andrea and Horatio, are conceived as unjust. Whereas Bel-Imperia decides to avenge for Andrea's death by making Balthazar jealous of her love for Horatio, Hieronimo vows to take the revenge of Horatio's death by killing those responsible for his son's death. The essential proposition of the play is articulated by the royal sovereign soon after the play opens, following the prologue of Andrea and the spirit of Revenge. Before the play begins, the Viceroy of Portugal had rebelled against Spanish rule, and in the battle Andrea was killed, the Portuguese were defeated. The king of Spain interprets this as a sign of divine justice: "Then bless'd be heaven and guider of the heavens, / From whose fair influence such justice flows" (I.1). The words of the king points at God as the sole source of justice, and acts as a warning to those who attempt at taking the exaction of justice into their hands. The following events are to demonstrate that an unjust death can only be avenged by divine

providence, and humans are only instrumental to it. The fate of those who attempt at the contrary is expressed by the spirit of Revenge at the end of Act I:

> Be still, Andrea; ere we go from hence,
> I'll turn their friendship into fell despite,
> Their love to mortal hate, their day to night.
> Their hope into despair, their peace to war,
> Their joys to pain, their bliss to misery. (I, 6)

How human intentions of taking revenge are twisted by fate is first demonstrated through Bel-Imperia's desire to avenge for Andrea's death. Bel-Imperia falls in love with Horatio mainly because of his loyalty to her former lover Andrea. She also confesses that she will love Horatio all the more to offend Balthazar who now wants to marry her:

> Yet what avails to wail Andrea's death,
> From whence Horatio proves my second love?
> Had he not lov'd Andrea as he did,
> He could not sit in Bellimperia's thoughts.
> But how can love find harbour in my breast,
> Till I revenge the death of my belov'd?
> Yes, second love shall further my revenge!
> I'll love Horatio, my Andrea's friend,
> The more to spite the prince that wrought his end.
> And where Don Balthazar, that slew my love,
> Himself now pleads for favour at my hands,
> He shall, in rigour of my just disdain,
> Reap long repentance for'his murd'rous deed. (I, 4)

Ironically, however, her love for Horatio will be the cause for his death at the hands of Lorenzo and Balthazar: her love for Horatio leads to more suffering than revenge and gives rise to more vengeful events. Nevertheless, not in the way Bel-Imperia intended but through a twist of fate, Horatio's death becomes the means through which Andrea's death is avenged. If Horatio had not died, Hieronimo would not have devised the plan which enabled him and Bel-Imperia to kill Horatio's murderers Lorenzo and Balthazar.

   Ignorant of Horatio's secret love affair with Bel-Imperia, Hieronimo cannot think of any reason that would lead anyone to murder his son. What Christian Wolff says in relation to Euripides' *Orestes* is also relevant for Hieronimo's case: "Revenge … becomes an irrational response to the world's failure to render what one imagines his due. It could be an attempt to force repayment on

the loss between what seems and what is".[9] Hieronimo resents the world where wickedness triumphs: "O life! no life, but lively form of death / O world! no world, but mass of public wrongs, / Confus'd and fill'd with murder and misdeeds!" (III, 2). Thus begins Hieronimo's tragedy; his anger and grief cause him to rebel against law although as the marshal of the state he should have more faith in justice than anyone else. He vows to avenge his son's death as soon as he discovers Horatio's body hanging from a tree in the garden, and takes his bloody handkerchief to keep as a token until he takes revenge, for only then can he find relief:

> See'st thou this handkercher besmear'd with blood?
> It shall not from me, till I take revenge.
> See'st thou those wounds that yet are bleeding fresh?
> I'll not entomb them, till I have revenge.
> Then will I joy amidst my discontent;
> Till then my sorrow never shall be spent. (II. 3)

Witnessing his best friend Horatio's death and Hieronimo's despair, Andrea questions the spirit of Revenge's intentions since the course of events do not seem to be moving towards an end satisfactory for him. Horatio was a paragon of honor and decency. He was the person to give Andrea proper burial after his death in the battlefield and make his access to the underworld possible. He was a noble soldier who defeated and captured Balthazar, the rebel against state, and thus gained the king's praise. Furthermore, he had always been a good son to his parents. His death is a source of grief to Andrea as well as his father, and seems to serve only to further his murderer's aims than revenge. However, the spirit of Revenge advises him to be patient implying that everything has its time and reason in the grand design of God:

> Thou talk'st of harvest, when the corn is green:
> The end is crown of every work well done;
> The sickle comes not, till the corn be ripe. (II. 6)

Hieronimo also knows that there is a right time for everything in the grand design as he later observes in his soliloquy known as *Vindicta mihi*. Yet, the undeserved murder of his son leads him to question divine justice:

> O sacred heav'ns! if this unhallowed deed,
> If this inhuman and barbarous attempt,

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[9]   Christian Wolff in Kerrigan, John. *Revenge Tragedy: Aeschylus to Armageddon.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996): 11.

> If this incomparable murder thus
> Of mine, but now no more my son,
> Shall unreveal'd and unreveng'd pass,
> How should we term your dealings to be just,
> If you unjustly deal with those that in your justice trust? (III, 2)

He needs proof of divine providence and seeks the help of heaven to send him a means to discover the murderer of his son: "Eyes, life, world, heav'ns, hell, night, and day, / See, search, shew, send some man, some mean, that may— " (III, 2). Almost as a response to his prayer, before he can even finish his sentence, he discovers Bel-Imperia's letter written in Horatio's blood that informs him about on whom to revenge. However, he will be cautious and not act before he confirms the accusation. Unable to reach Bel-Imperia, imprisoned in her room by her brother, Hieronimo laments his fate which put him in a position to distribute justice as the magistrate while he cannot have it for himself:

> Thus must we toil in other men's extremes,
> That know not how to remedy our own;
> And do them justice, when unjustly we,
> For all our wrongs, can compass no redress.
> But shall I never live to see the day,
> That I may come, by justice of the heavens,
> To know the cause that may my cares allay?
> This toils my body, this consumeth age,
> That only I to all men just must be,
> And neither gods nor men be just to me. (III. 6)

He does not yet know that he will discover the further proof about the criminals he seeks with the next case he will have to deal with as the magistrate. He finds the letter Pedringano wrote to Lorenzo in the hope of being rescued from execution at the end of this scene. Once again, his prayers are answered as proof of divine providence but he misconceives his role in the grand design. His *Vindicta mihi* soliloquy initially displays his awareness of his role as instrumental to divine will:

> Ay, heav'n will be reveng'd of every ill;
> Nor will they suffer murder unrepaid.
> Then stay, Hieronimo, attend their will:
> For mortal men may not appoint their time!— (III. 13)

He observes that all evil doings beget more evil, but does not realize that he will become a double of the criminals he hopes to punish by reiterating their crime of murder, and thus going against heavens:

> And to conclude, I will revenge his death!
> But how? not as the vulgar wits of men,
> With open, but inevitable ills,
> As by a secret, yet a certain mean,
> Which under kindship will be cloaked best.
> Wise men will take their opportunity
> Closely and safely, fitting things to time,—
> But in extremes advantage hath no time;
> And therefore all times fit not for revenge. (III. 13)

He decides to act in secrecy, conceal his knowledge and intentions under a cloak of kindness, and wait for the right time. From this aspect, he is no different from the criminals who murdered his son in the first place. His patience and faith in heavens displaced by his anger and passion for revenge, he even has fits of madness, especially after he witnesses an ordinary man grieve the death of his son and fervently demand justice for it. The duty of revenge has turned into a matter of honor for him, and his postponement a shame:

> Then sham'st thou not, Hieronimo, to neglect
> The sweet revenge of thy Horatio?
> Though on this earth justice will not be found,
> I'll down to hell, and in this passion
> Knock at the dismal gates of Pluto's court,
> Getting by force, as once Alcides did,
> A troop of Furies and tormenting hags
> To torture Don Lorenzo and the rest. (III. 13)

From one perspective, Hieronimo is right in his argument that Horatio did not deserve being killed for he was a perfect young man in every aspect; however, no cause legitimizes private revenge any longer in Renaissance England. It not only implies taking execution of justice into individual's hands but also defiance of God's will. Furthermore, what legitimizes revenge can be subjective and should not be decided upon privately. Ironically, for instance, Balthazar also explains his motive to murder Horatio with revenge:

> Both well and ill; it makes me glad and sad
> Glad, that I know the hind'rer of my love;
> Sad, that I fear she hates me whom I love.

> Glad, that I know on whom to be revenged;
> Sad, that she'll fly me, if I take revenge.
> Yet must I take revenge, or die myself, (II, 1)

For Balthazar thinks that his revenge is justified because Horatio first caused him to be captured by wounding him, and now inflicts further pain by hindering Bel-Imperia from loving him: "Thus hath he ta'en my body by his force, / And now by sleight would captivate my soul" (II, 1). However, this subjective view has no socio-legal or religious basis as a legitimate claim for revenge and justice. Hence, though he manages to kill Horatio, divine providence will not suffer him to go unpunished. He meets his death at the hands of Bel-Imperia whose lovers he murdered unjustly.

Although Heironimo and Bel-Imperia act as instruments for the execution of divine justice, they both have to die because they have committed a crime and a sin. On the other hand, their suicides both circumvent any possibility of punishment and leave no one directly responsible for their death, thus precluding a possible vendetta.

The ending of the play is noteworthy in that the deaths of not only Lorenzo and Balthazar but also all the others please Andrea's ghost:

> Ay, now my hopes have end in their effects,
> When blood and sorrow finish my desires:
> Horatio murder'd in his fathers bower;
> Vild Serberine by Pedringano slain;
> False Pedringano hang'd by quaint device;
> Fair Isabella by herself misdone;
> Prince Balthazar by Bellimperia stabb'd;
> The Duke of Castile and his wicked son
> Both done to death by old Hieronimo;
> My Bellimperia fall'n, as Dido fell,
> And good Hieronimo slain by himself:
> Ay, these were spectacles to please my soul! (IV. 5)

Andrea's ghost seems to imply that their deaths were only necessary for the exaction of revenge for his death as part of divine vengeance, and hence pleasing. Horatio's death impelled Hieronimo to take revenge; the deaths of Serberine and Pedringano were necessary – and deserved owing to their evil characters – as in this way was Hieronimo informed about whom to pursue in revenge; Isabella's death added to Hieronimo's grief and anger causing him to seek vengeance privately[i] since otherwise Balthazar and Lorenzo could have gone unpunished; Hieronimo and Bel-Imperia are the main agents of revenge and had to die as a consequence of their defiance of divine and state law.

Therefore, Andrea's ghost promises to beg Proserpine to grant those who died in pursuit of just revenge, Hieronimo and Bel-Imperia, and innocently, Horatio and his mother Isabella, a "pleasing" eternal life. The spirit of Revenge assures him that the rest will go down to the "deepest hell, / Where none but Furies, bugs and tortures dwell" (IV. 5). Hence, the ending of the only clearly establishes that it is divine providence, which sets the course of events in motion, and all the crimes, as well as innocent deaths, become subservient to justice being exacted for the death of Andrea.

While Kyd's *The Spanish Tragedy* is the first example of revenge tragedy in English Renaissance drama, and Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, with its all too familiar plot, is perhaps the best-known. *Hamlet* contains many of the elements of Kyd's formula: a ghost, a secret crime, a criminal who resorts to insane schemes to conceal his crime, madness, a play within the play intended to reveal the horrid crime, and revenge which leads to the death of not only the criminal but also all those guilty of several sins as well as the innocent. However, the bard construes revenge in the frame of a more sophisticated philosophical and socio-legal questioning. It is impossible to exhaust the multiple facets of Hamlet's dilemma here. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to pinpoint some of its variations on the theme of revenge especially after having mentioned its similarities with *The Spanish Tragedy*. Hamlet decides to take revenge for his father's murder, elder Hamlet the former king of Denmark, in the name of justice, and as part of his familial responsibility but, unlike Hieronimo, does not get carried away with uncontrollable passion. He is already in despair at the beginning of the play especially because of his mother's hasty marriage before he could mourn his father's death. His grief is aggravated when the ghost of his deceased father informs him about "his foul and most unnatural murder" and asks him to revenge (I. 5). Unlike Heironimo's, however, Hamlet's madness is not caused by his grief or anger but feigned, as a strategy in his scheme of revenge. Furthermore, he has no one to demand justice for his father's murder since it is the king who is supposed to be God's deputy that committed the crime. Thus, *Hamlet* poses a situation in which means of executing justice by the state are foreclosed, and he seems to have no other choice than undertake revenge as the son of the deceased and the prince of Denmark. However, he decides not kill Claudius when he finds him praying although he has the opportunity because he wants Claudius to die as "He took [his] father grossly, full of bread; / With all his crimes broad blown" (III. 3). Otherwise, he will not feel fully avenged: "and am I then revenged, / To take him in the purging of his soul, / When he is fit and season'd for his passage?" (III. 3). His understanding of justice is not simple retaliation and has not only secular but also religious implications involving the consequences in afterlife.

Claudius provokes Laertes to take revenge on Hamlet by invoking his love and loyalty to his father Polonius, who was killed by Hamlet, by saying "Laertes, was your father dear to you? / Or are you like the painting of a sorrow, / A face without a heart?" (IV. 7). When Leartes hesitates to kill Hamlet at church out of his respect for the sanctity of the place, Claudius's response, that "Revenge should have no bounds" (IV. 7) only fits a criminal king who is himself guilty of regicide than a royal sovereign representing divine justice on earth. The dramatic irony in the scene is, of course, that the same argument is also valid for Hamlet, who will take his revenge on Claudius regardless of the sanctity of his status although after prolonged episodes of hesitation. When Hamlet kills Claudius, he reiterates Claudius' foul crime of regicide and cannot become another king guilty of the same crime: he has to die. Another tragic hero distraught with the absence of meaning and justice in the world dies in his confrontation with the law.

Not all revengers are tragic heroes, however. In John Webster's *The Duchess of Malfi*, it is Bosola, gentleman of the horse to the duchess, hence a servant, who takes upon himself the duty of taking revenge for the death of the duchess after an experience of recognition. Bosola is no noble character or a tragic hero either in the Aristotelian or Hegelian sense of the word, and his sense of justice is hardly based on his virtuous character and is partly motivated with selfish reasons. He only gets involved in the events after being appointed as a spy on the Duchess by her two brothers, Ferdinand, the Duke of Calabria, and the Cardinal. Bosola, who she has taken as a gentleman of horse upon Cardinal's suggestion, betrays her secret of having married Antonio, a lowly steward, to her brothers. He betrays her once again when she makes the mistake of confiding her plan to escape from his brothers in him. Captured, not only the duchess but also her two children and maid are killed while Antonio manages to escape with their eldest son. When Bosola overhears the Cardinal confess his share in the death of the duchess and his intention of killing him, he decides to take revenge for all the injustices done, especially for the murder of the duchess. He goes to the chapel where he knows the Cardinal will be praying but mistakenly stabs Antonio much to his regret. However, he also manages to kill the Cardinal, and in a following brawl stabs Ferdinand to death. Nonetheless, he cannot escape the same fate, and dies. Hence, it is Bosola's betrayal that leads to the injustice that demands vengeance but he also becomes instrumental in exacting the justice. The eldest son of the duchess arrives only too late at the scene and inherits the Malfi fortune.

The tragic transgression that sets the events of the play in motion is not as easy to identify in *The Duchess of Malfi* as it was in the cases of *The Spanish Tragedy* and *Hamlet* since this question is best answered in relation to who the tragic hero of the play is. Whether there is a tragic hero in *The Duchess of Malfi* is disputable and a discussion that exceeds the limits or the purposes of this

paper. Suffice us to say here that the play defies many of the conventions of tragedy especially with its treatment of its characters. The Cardinal and Duke Ferdinand are depicted as villains from the beginning of the play and hardly qualify as tragic heroes. Both are greedy for financial gains, and the Cardinal, contrary to his position as a clergyman, is admittedly licentious. The duchess is an epitome of perfection with her modesty, elegance and lack of interest in material gains or social status. Bosola remarks her exceptional character thus:

> Do I not dream? Can this ambitious age
> Have so much goodness in 't as to prefer
> A man merely for worth, without these shadows
> Of wealth and painted honours? Possible? (III. 4)

Nevertheless, she transgresses social and religious law by marrying Antonio, someone not from her class, in secrecy and outside the sanction of the church, and gives birth to three children. Moreover, she dies way early in the end of the play, and it is her death that motivates the urge for revenge, which is undertaken unexpectedly by Bosola. Antonio, another character with admirable qualities of honesty, courage and disgust for power games at court, is far from being the main character of the play not only due to his lower social status but more so for his lack of agency in most events taking place. He fulfills the role ascribed to him by fate, and hardly confronts anyone or law directly. Even his defiance of social and religious law by marrying the duchess is occasioned through the initiative of the duchess.

A revenge tragedy, *The Duchess of Malfi* presents Bosola as the character through whom divine providence retaliates for the unjust murder of the duchess. Bosola is a complex character with true insight into the personalities of the people around him. He becomes instrumental in the deaths of the duchess and other innocent characters not because of his wickedness but because of his unquestioning obedience to his master, the Cardinal:

> I serv'd your tyranny, and rather strove
> To satisfy yourself than all the world :
> And though I loath'd the evil, yet I lov'd
> You that did counsel it ; and rather sought
> To appear a true servant than an honest man. (IV. 3)

In the end, Bosola displays integrity of character after an episode of anagnorisis, and dares what many so-called noble characters dare not by rebelling against his master whom he finds in the wrong. Nonetheless, he dies, as all avengers do, in his attempt after achieving his aim.

In revenge tragedies of the English Renaissance, revengers invariably die. Revenge is prohibited by the state and religion, and the individual attempts at vengeance only lead to more deaths, of the innocent as well, even when it is the sole means executing justice. In a sense, they are the sacrifices divine providence demands for the sustenance of law and order in the cosmos.

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Angry Wives in Elizabeth Cary's *The Tragedy Of Mariam: The Fair Queen Of Jewry*[1]

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Abstract

Set in 29 B.C., *The Tragedy of Mariam* (1613) is the first original play by a woman to be published in England. The forerunner of feminist drama, Elizabeth Cary attacks the commonly held assumption that anger, a sign of rebellion, is socially unacceptable for women. Cary's female characters violate their submissive roles by expressing anger at their husbands. Mariam, the Queen of Jewry, confesses in her soliloquy that she detests her husband Herod the Great, who murdered her brother and grandfather. Herod's sister, Salome, on the other hand, asks her husband for a divorce at a time when only men could legally end marriage. Salome challenges traditional female roles as well as racial stereotypes by taking an Arab lover. Instead of taking collective action to claim their legal rights, women support male dominance by oppressing other women on the grounds of class, race, and feminine virtue: Herod's ex-wife blames Mariam for stealing her husband; Mariam belittles "half-Jewish" Salome; Salome plots Mariam's death by falsely accusing her of being unfaithful to Herod. The play, then, does not idealize the angry wives, who rebel against their imprisonment in marriage. While Herod's anger results with the execution of Mariam, women's hostility toward one another endorses gender, racial, and religious discrimination. In the absence of a supportive network among women, their anger cannot change sexual politics, but instead only serves to uphold the prevailing social order based on sexual and racial inequality. Ironically, the public regards not Herod, but Salome a murderer for plotting the deaths of Mariam and her husband. The play serves as a critique of gender inequality in early modern England that justifies male violence but regards women's outspokenness a crime.

Keywords: Elizabeth Cary, *The Tragedy of Mariam*, Salome, feminism, women, anger

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Elizabeth Cary'nin *The Tragedy of Mariam: The Fair Queen of Jewry* Adlı Oyununda Kadın ve Öfke

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Özet

MÖ 29 yılında geçen *The Tragedy of Mariam* (1613) İngiltere'de bir kadın yazar tarafından yayımlanan ilk orijinal oyundur. Feminist tiyatronun öncüsü olan Cary, toplumda başkaldırmanın sembolü olan öfkenin sadece erkeklere özgü olduğu ve kadınların hep sessiz ve uysal olmaları gerektiği kanısını eleştirir. Cary'nin kadın karakterleri—Yahudilerin kraliçesi Mariam ve görümcesi Salome—kocalarına itaat etmeyi bırakıp onlara karşı duydukları nefreti açıkça dile getirirler. Örneğin, Mariam savaşta hayatını kaybettiğini düşündüğü kocası Kral Herod'un yasını tutmaz ve sahnede yalnızken kardeşi ve dedesini öldürmüş olan kocasına adeta kin kusar. Herod'un kardeşi Salome ise kadınların kanunen boşanma hakkı olmadığı bir dönemde kocasına onu aldattığını ve ayrılmak istediğini korkusuzca söyler. Bir Arap sevgilisinin olduğunu itiraf ederek toplumdaki ırkçılığa ve geleneksel kadın rollerine karşı çıkar. Fakat birlik olup toplumda kadın hakları için savaşmak yerine karakterler birbirlerini sınıf, ırk ve namus üzerinden yargılayıp ezerler: Kral Herod'un eski karısı Mariam'ı kocasını çalmakla suçlar; Mariam yarı Yahudi olan Salome'yi melez bir hayvana benzetir. Gururu incinen Salome, intikam almak için Mariam'ın kocasını aldattığı ve zehirlemeye çalıştığı masalını uydurur ve böylece kıskanç Herod'un karısını öldürmesine sebep olur. Oyun, öfkeyi ataerkil topluma yöneltmek yerine birbirlerini aşağılayan kadınların toplumdaki din, ırk ve cinsiyet rolleriyle ilgili önyargıları ne kadar beslediğini gösterir. Toplumun, karısını ve birçok düşmanını öldürmüş olan Kral Herod yerine öldürücü planlar yapan kardeşi Salome'yi aşağılık bir katil olarak dışlaması ironiktir. MÖ 29 yılında geçen bu oyun aslında 17. yüzyıl İngiltere'sinin bir yandan erkek şiddetini onaylarken diğer taraftan kadınların toplumda seslerini yükseltmelerini bir suç unsuru saydığını göstererek kadın erkek eşitsizliğine dikkat çeker.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Elizabeth Cary, *The Tragedy of Mariam*, Salome, feminizm, kadınlar, öfke

Introduction

Elizabeth Cary (1585-1639) was the first female British playwright to publish an original play during the reign of James I, when the literary sphere was primarily dominated by male writers. Nancy Cotton Pearse points out Cary's "extraordinary achievement" as a woman dramatist of the Renaissance: "Englishwomen before her had translated or adapted full-length plays by others, […] but Cary was the first to construct her own plot and create her own characters."[2] Set in 29 B. C., *The Tragedy of Mariam* (1613) was also the first play to depict the lives of the Jewish Queen Mariam and King Herod, who reigned over Judea, a region that was dominated by the Roman Empire. In their introduction to *The Tragedy of Mariam*, Barry Weller and Margaret Ferguson write: "In 39 B. C. Herod was appointed King of the Jews by the Romans, and, after a military campaign, took possession of Jerusalem and his throne in 37 B. C. He thus displaced Antigonus, the last ruler of the Maccabean, or Hasmonean, dynasty, to which Mariam, his second wife, and her family belonged."[3] During the siege of Jerusalem, Herod killed Mariam's male relatives, who had a better claim to the throne, and asked his sister Salome's husband, Constabarus, to execute his enemies. Constabarus, however, concealed the supporters of Antigonus, the sons of Babas, who "might be helpful to him in subsequent changes of government."[4] The play starts with Mariam's soliloquy upon hearing the false news that Caesar Augustus has killed Herod in Rome. When Herod surprisingly comes back home, he executes Constabarus for setting Babas' sons free, and Mariam for her presumed adultery. Drawing her material from Thomas Lodge's 1602 translation of Josephus's *Jewish Antiquities*, Elizabeth Cary was courageous enough to publish a historical play at a time when writing was a male profession, and for this reason, she was described as an eccentric Catholic woman with masculine traits.[5]

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[2]   Nancy Cotton Pearse, "Elizabeth Cary, Renaissance Playwright," *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 18.4 (1977): 601.

[3]   Barry Weller and Margaret W. Ferguson, "Introduction," in *The Tragedy of Mariam, the Fair Queen of Jewry with The Lady Falkland: Her Life*, ed. Barry Weller and Margaret W. Ferguson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 63.

[4]   Ibid.

[5]   Elaine Beilin writes in "Elizabeth Cary (1585-1639): "The attribution of masculinity that has haunted Elizabeth Cary's intellectual achievements may explain why women so carefully guarded or apologized for their abilities. For many reasons, Cary—a scholar, dramatist, poet, religious polemicist, wife, and mother—encountered difficulties in practically every aspect of her life; a source of continual conflict was her attempt to live

As a married playwright who managed to balance her literary talents and domestic duties, Cary became the forerunner of feminist drama and questioned ideals of femininity in early modern England. With angry heroines trapped in marriage, Cary, as early as the 1600s, suggested that female roles of obedience and silence were not natural but socially determined. In "Anger and Insubordination," Elizabeth Spelman argues that even as women are expected to be emotional, they are not allowed to express anger, which is a sign of rebellion against the prevailing social order. Although in rather different ways, Cary's female characters—Mariam and her sister-in-law, Salome—violate their submissive roles by expressing anger at their husbands. Unable to mourn Herod's presumed death, for example, Mariam confesses her long-time wish to see her despotic husband give his last breath. Herod's sister, Salome, on the other hand, asks Constabarus for a divorce at a time when only men could legally end marriage. Instead of taking collective action to claim their legal rights, women support male dominance by oppressing other women on the grounds of class, race, and feminine virtue: Herod's ex-wife, Doris, blames Mariam for stealing her husband; Mariam takes pride of her royal-blood and compares Salome to her servants. To take revenge on the scornful queen, Salome plots Mariam's death by falsely accusing her of being unfaithful to Herod and of attempting to poison him with a love potion. Ironically, even Mariam's mother, Alexandra, wants Mariam to be punished for shaming her family. While challenging traditional female roles of passivity and modesty, Cary's play also shows how women contribute to male domination by suppressing other women.

Although Cary's play is set in another time and place, the heroines' rage against their entrapment in marriage speaks to British women's suppressed anger concerning their limited roles as nurturers in the early seventeenth century. With James I's 1603 speech to the Parliament, England was "invented" and "gendered" as the motherland to secure conventional female roles of virtue and domesticity: "What God hath conioyned then, let no man separate. I am the Husband, and all the whole Isle is my lawful Wife."[6] The King's representation of England as his wife gave British women the responsibility to protect the nation's moral foundations by serving as chaste and respectable mothers. As Anne McClintock argues, a community's construction as a "familial and domestic space" depends "on the prior naturalizing of the social subordination

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the 'masculine' life of the mind while devotedly carrying out the role and duties of a woman" (London: Routledge, 1998), 167.

[6] Quoted in Karen Raber, "Gender and the political subject in The Tragedy of Mariam," *Studies in English Literature* 35.2 (1995): 332.

of women and children within the domestic sphere."[7] The ideals of feminine virtue were naturalized as women became the ground upon which England's degree of honor was measured. Women's sexual desires were also domesticated with representations of sex as a utilitarian act and motherhood as the most sacred female duty. "A virtuous woman crowns her husband's head,"[8] Salome's husband declares; he believes that adulterous women disgrace their family, race, and country. Since the queen's fall from virtue signifies the fall of the nation, Herod executes Mariam for her (falsely assumed) affair with his counselor and restores his sovereignty as the absolute patriarch of ancient Palestine. With Salome's and Mariam's rebellion against their subservient positions in marriage, Cary hints at British women's similar resistance to the rule of James I, who announced the divine rights of kings and supported male roles of authority and power.

Mariam's anger at Herod:

Cary attacks the commonly held belief that women are essentially fragile, sensitive, and loving by starting her play with Mariam's soliloquy expressing her anger at Herod, who had ordered her execution if he died in war. With her mixed feelings of "grief and joy" upon Herod's death, the queen deviates from her duty to show unconditional love and devotion to her husband. Having internalized her wifely duties, she also blames herself for being "hard-hearted" and for disgracing the king by not grieving his death. The seemingly coy and delicate queen's long-time wish to see Herod's corpse and her secret joy at his slaughter in Rome suggest that anger is not reserved for men alone:

> MARIAM. So at his death your eyes true drops did rain,
> Whom dead, you did not wish alive again.
> When Herod liv'd, that now is done to death,
> Oft have I wish'd that I from him were free:
> Oft have I wish'd that he might lose his breath,
> Oft have I wish'd his carcass dead to see.[9]

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[7] Anne McClintock, "'No Longer in a Future Heaven': Gender, Race and Nationalism," in *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation, and Postcolonial Perspectives,* ed. Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti, and Ella Shohat (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 90-91.

[8] Elizabeth Cary, "The Tragedy of Mariam," in *The Tragedy of Mariam, the Fair Queen of Jewry with The Lady Falkland: Her Life*, ed. Barry Weller and Margaret W. Ferguson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), I. 6. 396.

[9] Ibid., I. 1. 13-18.

With the repetition of "oft have I wish'd" in successive lines, Mariam emerges as a female agent conveying her socially unacceptable feelings of rage and scorn for her tyrannical husband. She privileges her personal interests over the nation by wishing for Herod's death, which is her only way out of marriage. However, the Chorus, a "company of Jews," advises Mariam to restrain her anger. Mariam's violent and vengeful voice counters the Chorus's belief that married women should not have "power as well as will." [10]

At a time when women's public speech was a threat to male authority, Mariam expresses her anger at Herod not only in her soliloquy but also in her conversation with Herod's counselor, Sohemus, who spares her life after the king's presumed death. She opens her heart to Sohemus and tells him that she would rather see the city burned or die disgracefully rather than hear the news of Herod's return. The queen confesses to the counselor that she grieves Herod's life more than his death, and declares her intention not to share her bed with the husband she profoundly hates:

> MARIAM. I will not to his love be reconcil'd,
> With solemn vows I have forsworn his bed.
>
> SOHEMUS. But you must break those vows. […]
>
> MARIAM. I'll rather break
> The heart of Mariam. Cursed is my fate:
> But speak no more to me, in vain ye speak
> To live with him I so profoundly hate. […]
> And must I to my prison turn again? […]
> But now that curtain's drawn from off my thought,
> Hate doth appear again with visage grim:
> And paints the face of Herod in my heart,
> In horrid colours and detested look:[11]

Her confidant Sohemus encourages Mariam to suppress her anger for Herod, who would not tolerate her defiance of wifely duties. "Unbridled speech is Mariam's worst disgrace, / And will endanger her without desert," Sohemus states, and it is her free speech that brings her downfall at the end of the play.[12] Indeed, Richard Brathwaite's conduct book *The English Gentlewoman* (1631) advises women not to express themselves publicly: "bashful silence is an

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[10] Ibid., III. 3. 218.

[11] Ibid., III. 3. 132-160.

[12] Ibid., III. 3. 183.

ornament to their sex. […] Modesty and honor require that in public a woman observe rather than discourse." [13] The Chorus too attributes silence to women by commenting that Mariam "wounds her honour" by speaking her mind to those other than her husband. Cary, however, gives voice to Mariam, who boldly challenges the myth of marriage as a happy-ever-after ending by comparing her house to prison.

The transformation of Mariam from a silent to an outspoken wife is evident upon Herod's unexpected return. When Herod asks why she wears "dusky" and gloomy clothes, she boldly expresses her unhappiness in marriage: "My lord, I suit my garment to my mind, / And there no cheerful colours can I find." [14] As Mariam refuses to make love to Herod, he says that her bitter and hateful attitude will bring her downfall:

> HEROD. This froward humour will not do you good:
> It hath too much already Herod griev'd,
> To think that you on terms of hate have stood.
> Yet smile, my dearest Mariam, do but smile,
> And I will all unkind conceits exile.
>
> MARIAM. I cannot frame disguise, nor never taught
> My face a look dissenting from my thought. [15]

Herod's repetition of the word "smile" within the same line suggests how women are perceived as charming and carefree playthings for men, and are discouraged from expressing anger to their husbands. Spelman writes that "dominant groups wish to place limits on the kinds of emotional responses appropriate to those subordinate to them;" [16] Herod attempts to maintain Mariam's conformity to his decisions by insisting that she smile. However, Salome reveals Mariam's inability to disguise her hate: "She speaks a beauteous language, but within / Her heart is false as powder." [17] She implies that Mariam has performed the role of a caring wife while resenting Herod for

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[13] Quoted in Ya-huei Wang, "Women's Position in the Renaissance Period: The Case of *The Tragedy of Mariam*," *Journal of Theater, Dance, and Performance Studies* 1 (1) (2010): 2.

[14] Cary, "Mariam," IV. 3. 91-2.

[15] Ibid., IV. 3. 140-146.

[16] Elizabeth Spelman, "Anger and Insubordination," in *Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy*, ed. Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 270.

[17] Cary, "Mariam," IV. 7. 429-431.

her brother's death. In fact, even though Mariam knew of Herod's crimes before she married him, it is only after becoming the Queen of Jewry and bearing a successor to the throne that she dares to show anger to her husband.

Ironically, while expressing anger at her brother's murderer after several years of being married to him, Mariam does not even try to go against her death sentence. Herod deviates from his masculine role of rationality when he blindly believes Salome's tale that Mariam attempted to poison him with a love potion and fell in love with his counselor. Without even asking Salome for proof, Herod condemns Mariam as a fair-seeming "enchantress" with an "impure mind" and a "loathsome soul" for disgracing his family. When Herod asks Mariam why she fell in love with Sohemus, she calmly utters her last words to her husband: "They can tell / That say I lov'd him, Mariam says not so."[18] She does not insist on her innocence or utter any other word to stop her execution. Her silence before death simultaneously casts her as a passive victim and indicates her choice of death over her imprisonment in marriage. On the verge of death, the queen publicly despises her murderous husband with her "dutiful though scornful smile."[19] Her "cheerful face" suggests that she is content to end a life of pretense. Without any tears or cries for help, she refuses to play the role of a helpless and weak woman and instead dies proudly with a disdainful and mocking attitude towards Herod.

Salome speaks up for women's right to divorce:

While Mariam's defiance of Herod's authority is limited to her scornful smile before her execution, Salome fearlessly asks for a divorce from Constabarus so that she can marry Silleus, the chief minister of the king of Arabia. In her soliloquy, Salome complains that her Jewish society represses female desire by condemning premarital sex and by giving the right to divorce only to men. While Herod freely divorces Doris for Mariam, Salome has to suppress her passion for Silleus and endure her loveless marriage. Salome's cry for equal legal rights evokes how King Henry VIII of England (1509-1547) broke with the Roman Catholic Church to divorce Catherine of Aragon and marry Anne Boleyn, while his subjects had very limited divorce rights.[20] For Salome, women, too, can fall out of love and break their marriage vows:

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[18]   Ibid., IV. 4. 194.

[19]   Ibid. V. 1. 52.

[20]   Sara Mendelson and Patricia Crawford state in *Women in Early Modern England*: "During the early modern period, wives were not permitted to initiate an action for divorce which allowed remarriage. Nor was divorce available to husbands, apart from a few wealthy peers who, after 1670, could secure a private act of Parliament to allow them to remarry" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 141.

SALOME. He loves, I love; what then can be the cause
Keeps me [from] being the Arabian's wife?
It is the principles of Moses' laws,
For Constabarus still remains in life.
If he to me did bear as earnest *hate*,
As I to him, for him there were an ease;
A separating bill might free his fate
From such a yoke that did so much displease.
Why should such privilege to man be given?
Or given to them, why barr'd from women then?
Are men than we in greater grace with Heaven?
Or cannot women hate as well as men?
I'll be the custom-breaker: and begin
To show my sex the freedom's door, […].[21]

Cursing her "ill-fate" to be with Constabarus until death, Salome questions why only men have the right to hate and divorce their wives. "Are men than we in greater grace with Heaven?," she asks and suggests that gender roles that endorse male dominance may not be God-given. In a society where men are the judges and lawgivers, Salome wants to alter the legal system to give women the right for divorce. She was quite ahead of her time in this thinking: this right was not legalized in England until 1857.

Salome becomes a "custom-breaker" by declaring her love for an Arab in a community that condemns interracial and extramarital relationships. When she boldly tells Constabarus that Silleus will take his room, Constabarus blames her for disgracing her race, country, and her family: "I blush for you, that have your blushing lost."[22] While judging his wife on the basis of feminine virtue, he also supports white supremacy by referring to Silleus as "a base Arabian:"

SALOME. To stop disgrace? […]
Thou shalt no hour longer call me wife,
Thy jealousy procures my hate so deep:
That I from thee do mean to free my life,
By a divorcing bill before I sleep.

CONSTABARUS. Are Hebrew women now transformed to men?
Why do you not as well our battles fight,

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21   Cary, "Mariam," I. 4. 297-310 (my emphasis).

22   Ibid., I. 6. 378.

> And wear our armour?[23]

Salome courageously defends her affair, which presumably disgraces her family. In the absence of divorce rights, she becomes a lawmaker by ordering her husband not to call her his wife. Ironically, Constabarus considers her desire to liberate herself from marriage unwomanly. As early as the 1600s, Cary portrayed how men became heroes for fighting for their nation while women were condemned for standing up for their legal rights.

Instead of fighting against divorce laws that privilege men, Salome finds an easier way out of marriage by plotting her husband's death. Salome promises to get Herod's consent for her brother Pheroras's marriage to a maid, and, in return, she asks Pheroras to tell the king that Constabarus disobeyed his order to execute his foes, the sons of Babas. Salome knows Herod would not be influenced by a woman, and, therefore, she uses a man's voice to manipulate the king: "This will be Constabarus' quick dispatch, / Which from my mouth would lesser credit find."[24] Pheroras obeys his sister's order and even justifies her break up with Constabarus by lying to Herod, saying that Salome chose her love for the nation over her traitor husband, who has been hiding the sons of Babas in his farm for twelve years. While Herod is blind to Salome's artful plan to become the Arabian's bride, Constabarus knows that it is her "hateful mind" that plots his death. "Angriness plays an important political role in enabling resistance, but is not inevitably emancipatory,"[25] Mary Holmes writes, and Salome's anger is not a constructive emotion that brings positive political change but a destructive act that results in the death of Mariam and Constabarus.

Although Herod and Salome are both murderers, the fact that the former is perceived as powerful and omnipotent while the latter is considered shrewd, "serpent-like," and "wors[e] than devil" suggests that violence is tolerated only in men. While no one questions Herod's execution of Mariam, Salome is guilty of "the blackest deed" for her murderous plots.[26] Ironically, Constabarus's anger is not directed at his executioner, Herod, but at Salome for revealing his secret that he has been hiding Herod's foes. Infidelity to a husband, then, constitutes a worse crime than the deadly decision of an oppressive king. Glossing over Herod's crimes of murder, Constabarus favors all Jewish men as worthy, and curses women, except Mariam, for being treacherous and wicked:

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[23] Ibid., I. 6. 412-423.

[24] Ibid., III. 2. 81-82.

[25] Mary Holmes, "Feeling Beyond Rules: Politicizing the Sociology of Emotion and Anger in Feminist Politics," *European Journal of Social Theory* 7.2 (2004): 223.

[26] Cary, "Mariam," IV. 5. 265.

> CONSTABARUS. You tigers, lionesses, hungry bears,
> Tear-massacring hyenas: nay, far worse,
> For they prey do shed their feigned tears.
> But you will weep (you creatures cross to good),
> For your unquenched thirst of human blood:
> You were the angels cast from Heav'n for pride,
> And still do keep your angels' outward show,
> But none of you are inly beautified […]
> You are the wreck of order, breach of laws.
> [Your] best are foolish, froward, wanton, vain,
> Your worst adulterous, murderous, cunning, proud:
> And Salome attends the latter train, […][27]

Constabarus dehumanizes angry women by using animalistic images and implies that it is only in man's nature to be violent. Harriet Lerner comments that "the direct expression of anger, especially at men," makes women "'shrews,' 'witches,' 'bitches,' 'hags,' 'nags,' 'man-haters;'"[28] Constabarus also scorns Salome for being unladylike and glosses over the fact that women's anger is a political tool to rebel against their oppressive marriages.

The text, however, does not confirm Constabarus's representation of female violence as a despicable crime: no poetic justice punishes Salome for her cunning and murderous plots. Unlike Mariam, she is not portrayed as a passive victim but rather as a triumphant survivor of female oppression. Berry Weller and Margaret Ferguson write that Salome freely executes plans "that a Mariam [...] might imagine but never actually perform," and her "theatrical energy reinforces the impression that Cary is, unofficially, intrigued rather than repelled by Mariam's evil twin."[29] Unaware of the fact that Mariam, too, wants her husband dead, Constabarus sets her aside from his stereotypical classification of women as either foolish or treacherous. In fact, Salome's comment that Mariam's "eyes do sparkle joy for Herod's death,"[30] problematizes Weller and Ferguson's distinction between the innocent queen and her villainous sister-in-law. Ironically, it is not the murderous Salome, but the queen with conflicting emotions of love and anger, and obedience and

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[27] Ibid., IV. 6. 316-335.

[28] Harriet Lerner, *The Dance of Anger: A Woman's Guide to Changing the Patterns of Intimate Relationships* (New York: Perennial Currents, 1985), 2.

[29] Barry Weller and Margaret W. Ferguson, "Introduction," 40.

[30] Cary, "Mariam," I. 3. 210.

rebellion, who is beheaded in the play. Mariam's tragic flaw[31] is her lack of courage and determination to overtly challenge male power, and her refusal to be a political actor by exerting influence on Herod's decisions.

Women against Women: Salome, Mariam, and Doris

Instead of taking collective action against gender inequality, Cary's female characters channel their hate towards other women and blame one another for their subservient position in society. Michel Foucault's definition of power suggests that both sexes contribute to the functioning of the patriarchal system: "power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those who 'do not have it'; it invests them, is transmitted by them and through them."[32] Cary's play shows how women contribute to male dominance by victimizing each other on the grounds of feminine virtue, class, and race, which, according to Gwynne Kennedy, primarily meant family and lineage in early modern England. At the time of its publication in 1613, the play served as a critique of British women of the time, who perpetuated female oppression by venting out their rage ineffectively at women.

Mariam, for example, displaces much of her anger for Herod onto Salome by using a "class-inflected language that serves the interests of those benefiting from the prevailing social order."[33] When Salome comments that Herod deserves a better wife, Mariam declares that a woman with a "baser birth" is not qualified to judge the queen:

> MARIAM. My betters far! Base woman, 'tis untrue,
> You scarce have ever my superiors seen:
> For Mariam's servants were as good as you,
> Before she came to be Judea's queen.[34]

While Mariam insults Salome by comparing her to her former servants, Alexander advises her daughter that even having a conversation with Herod's

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[31]   While Jeanne Addison Roberts argues that Mariam's tragic flaw is her pride, I agree with Jeffrey Lodge that her "mental turmoil, of being torn between wanting to be morally correct and believing herself not to be, is Mariam's tragedy" (*Pleiades*, 1992), 64.

[32]   Michel Foucault, "The Body of Condemned," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984). 174.

[33]   Gwynne Kennedy, *Just Anger: Representing Women's Anger in Early Modern England* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois U. P, 2000), 52.

[34]   Cary, "Mariam," I. 3. 223-226.

sister would be stooping: "Come, Mariam, let us go: it is no boot / To let the head contend against the foot."[35] Mariam also takes advantage of her social status as the Queen of Jewry to claim that only her son can inherit the throne. She tells Herod's ex-wife, Doris, that the king does not esteem his first-born son, who does not share the queen's aristocratic lineage: "My children only for his own he deem'd, / These boys that did descend from royal line."[36] Mariam's emphasis on royal heritage to declare her superiority serves as a critique of early modern England that privileges the interests of the aristocracy.

The "fair" queen of Jewry also despises Salome for being half-Jewish and half-Edomite,[37] the Edomites being a group of Jews who lived close to Arabs for centuries. The pure-blooded Jewess claims her racial superiority by attributing Salome's "black acts" to her descent from the Edomites, inhabitants of the ancient kingdom of Edom, which was in conflict with Israel:

> MARIAM. Thou parti-Jew, and parti-Edomite,
> Thou mongrel: issu'd from rejected race,
> Thy ancestors against the Heavens did fight,
> And thou like them wilt heavenly birth disgrace.
>
> SALOME. […] What odds betwixt your ancestors and mine?
> Both born of Adam, both were made of earth,
> And both did come from holy Abraham's line.
> MARIAM. I favour thee when nothing else I say,
> With thy black acts I'll not pollute my breath:[38]

As Mariam claims the superiority of her "fair" Maccabean family over the Edomites, Salome foregrounds their common lineage by commenting that they are both "born of Adam" and the followers of the prophet, Abraham. Mariam's focus on Salome's degree of Jewishness also resonates with the religious

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[35]   Ibid., I. 3. 259-260.

[36]   Ibid., I. 2. 137-138.

[37]   In *Dido's Daughters*, Margaret Ferguson writes: "The name of the people or 'nation' of Edom was frequently derived, by both Jewish and Christian commentators, from Esau, son of Isaac. […] Esau's descendant Herod does not deserve to occupy a throne that should be occupied instead by members of Mariam's family, the Maccabeans, who claimed descent from [Esau's brother] Jacob" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 325. Esau and Jacob are the sons of Isaac and the grandsons of the prophet Abraham.

[38]   Cary, "Mariam," I. 3. 235-245.

discrimination in Renaissance England: "While Jews had been expelled from England in 1290, and Queen Elizabeth had twice tried to expel both 'Negroes and blackamoors' from England in 1596 and 1601," there was also a national anxiety that Christianized Jews and Muslims "continued to practice Judaism and Islam in secret."[39] Mariam's representation of Edomites as a "rejected race" is analogous to the discrimination of the Catholics with the establishment of the Anglican Church during the reign of Henry VIII. Although the play is set in the pre-Christian period, the two Jewish women's dispute over religion serves as a critique of the conflict between Protestants and Catholics, and the hostility against the religious minorities in England.

Ironically, discriminated against on the grounds of race and class, Salome takes revenge on Mariam by judging her against traditional female roles and by framing her as an unfaithful wife. Marked as a shameful woman by her husband, Salome supports the feminine virtue of chastity by making Herod believe that the queen is having an affair with his counselor. Salome oppresses Mariam in just the same way Constabarus oppresses Salome, calling Mariam a woman with "impudency" marked on her forehead. She comments that although Mariam does not blush out of shame, her "foul dishonours do her forehead blot."[40] Salome fails to "show [her] sex the freedom's door" by framing Mariam as a fallen woman to justify her execution. Instead of forming a female bond to free themselves from their unhappy marriages, Salome and Mariam perpetuate ideals of feminine virtue by policing each other's sexual conduct.

To secure herself in Herod's kingdom, even Mariam's mother, Alexander, allies herself with Salome by condemning the queen for wronging her noble husband. A messenger informs Herod that Alexander supports the king's decision to kill the unfaithful queen: "She told her that her death was too too good, / And that already she had liv'd too long: / She said, she sham'd to have a part in blood/ Of her that did the princely Herod wrong."[41] Herod, who Alexander once labeled as a "fatal enemy," "vile wretch," "base Edomite" and "lunatic" for killing her son, becomes "princely" for executing her "fallen" daughter. Ironically, while mourning for and rebelling against Herod's murder of her son and father, Alexander justifies and accepts Mariam's punishment for her presumed adultery. By viewing honor crimes as pardonable and not pleading for Mariam's life, Alexander also secures her safe place in Herod's male-dominated society. Her denouncement of Mariam for Herod shows that

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[39] Kimberly Woosley Poitevin, "'Counterfeit Colour': Making up Race in Elizabeth Cary's 'The Tragedy of Mariam,'" *Tulsa Studies in Women's Literature* 24.1 (2005): 18.

[40] Cary, "Mariam," IV. 7. 406.

[41] Ibid., V. 1. 41-44.

even mothers can feel compelled to comply with patriarchal traditions, even if those traditions require their daughters to be killed for dishonoring their families.

With Mariam's execution, Herod's ex-wife, Doris, too, takes revenge from the queen who took her husband. Instead of directing her anger towards Herod, who left his family after five years of marriage, she prays for Mariam's death: "The fall of her that on my trophy stands. / Revenge I have according to my will, / Yet where I wish'd this vengeance did not light: / I wish'd it should high-hearted Mariam kill."[42] The way she channels her anger towards Mariam shows that she has accepted men's right to leave their wives for other women. She laments that Mariam robbed her from the prospect of becoming the queen of Jewry. "Was I not fair enough to be a queen?" Doris asks, and questions whether she is not racially pure, noble, and virtuous enough to represent the country or to be the mother of Herod's successor. Doris's ambitious son, on the other hand, wants to murder his "bastard" brothers to replace his presumably dead father's "royal seat and dignity."[43] Instead of saving Mariam from death, Doris enjoys the fact that she, too, is a victim of Herod's tyranny, and that the "black," "spotted," and sinful queen deserves to be punished. The Chorus comments that "in base revenge there is no honour won,"[44] and regards Doris's vengeance against the queen on death row ignoble. The Chorus represents Doris as "a worthless foe" to Mariam because of her inability to show anger at her deserting husband, whose deadly decision she fully supports and celebrates.

Overall, as a Catholic writer oppressed by both patriarchy and the Protestant Church, Cary was well-positioned to portray how ideologies of sex, race, and religion intersected in British women's oppression in the early 1600s. Although Cary was ahead of her time with her portrayal of angry wives trapped in marriage, her attack of sexual and racial discrimination was limited to her closet drama, which was never performed on stage. Mariam's violent wish for Herod's death and Salome's adulterous relationship with an Arab could have been more effective on stage, reaching a wider audience and encouraging them to question the white male supremacy during the reign of James 1. The lofty style of tragedy and the lack of stage performance made the play accessible only to the aristocracy. The enclosed and isolated space of closet drama, which was performed only in households, permitted Cary to criticize the established authority without overtly transgressing her private sphere. In fact, the play ends with a moralistic tone as the Chorus confirms Mariam's innocence, and also advises Hebrews to call for "the school of wisdom" to restore social order. The

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[42] Ibid., II. 3. 250-253.

[43] Ibid., II. 3. 257.

[44] Ibid., V. 1. 638.

Chorus suggests that wisdom should replace anger, which, in one day, has resulted in the death of Mariam, Constabarus, and the sons of Babas. While Herod's anger breeds violence, women's hostility toward one another normalizes gender, racial, and religious discrimination. The female characters' socially unacceptable feelings of hate and anger, which do not even come to life on stage, do not subvert male dominance or change divorce laws. In the absence of an empowering and supportive network among women, their anger cannot change sexual politics, but instead only serves to uphold the prevailing social order based on sexual and racial inequality.

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Three Sonneteers: Sidney, Spenser, Wroth

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Abstract

The sonnet has been an enduring form which has remained popular with poets throughout the centuries. The origins of the form dates to Franceso Petrarch who is regarded to be the "father'" of the sonnet. After the form reached its maturity in Italy, it was exported to Europe and nearly all European poets experimented with it. Renaissance England was introduced to the sonnet by Wyatt and it remained a popular and powerful poetic form for over a century. This article deals with three sonneteers experimented with sonnet sequences within the confines of its strict structure. The two poets studied are Sir Philip Sidney and his sequence *Astrophel and Stella*, and Edmund Spenser and his *Amoretti*. Sidney and Spenser are better known sonneteers, but the third poet in the context of this study has remained more obscure. Even though Lady Mary Wroth was celebrated by the poets of her age, her oeuvre as a poet has drawn attention only in the past few decades, particularly her experimentation with the reversal of traditional gender roles in her sonnet sequence *Pamphilia to Amphilantus*. Overall, this study deals with the ways in which these three sonneteers explore the emotions of the human heart in the confines of the strict sonnet from.

Keywords: Renaissance, poetry, sonnet, Sidney, Spenser, Wroth

Üç Sone Yazarı: Sidney, Spenser, Wroth

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Özet

Sone formu yüzyıllar boyu şairler tarafından kullanılan kalıcı bir form olmuştur. Sonenin başlangıcı bu formun "babası" olarak görülen İtalyan şair Franceso Petrarch'a dayanır. İtalya'da olgunlaşan sone formu Avrupa'ya ihraç edilmiş ve neredeyse bütün Avrupalı şairler tarafından kullanılmıştır. Sone Rönesans İngilteresi'ne Wyatt tarafından tanıştırılmış, yüzyıl kadar bir süre önde gelen kuvvetli bir şiirsel form olarak kalmıştır. Bu makale dar kalıplı bir form olan sone ile denemeler yapan üç şair üzerinedir. Bu şairlerden ikisi ve eserleri, Sir Philip Sidney (*Astrophel ile Stella*) ve Edmund Spenser (*Amoretti*), daha iyi bilinen şair ve eserlerdir. Ancak Lady Mary Wroth yaşadığı dönemde iyi bilinen bir şair olmasına rağmen ancak son yıllarda dikkat çekmiştir. Özellikle geleneksel cinsiyet rollerini sorguladığı *Pamphilia ve Amphilantus* başlıklı eseri önem kazanmıştır. Genel olarak düşünüldüğünde, bu makale üç Rönesans şairinin insan kalbine ait duyguları sonenin dar kalıpları içerisinde inceleyişlerini ele almaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Rönesans, şiir, sone, Sidney, Spenser, Wroth

English Renaissance saw the flowering of the sonnet form as sonneteers were willing to experiment within the confines of its strict structure. This paper explores three of these sonneteers. Two of them, Sir Philip Sidney, Edmund Spenser, are better known and studied whereas the third, Lady Mary Wroth began to receive attention in the past decades, even though she was celebrated by the leading poets of her age.

1   Sir Philip Sidney: *Astrophel and Stella*

Sir Philip Sidney (1554-1586) is one of the most important Renaissance poets of England. As a fine example of the Renaissance ideal of aristocracy, he is considered to be the model of the perfect Renaissance man. A courtier in Queen Elizabeth's court, he was the embodiment of the medieval virtues of the knight, the lover, and the scholar who was well experienced in courtly love. Such a background inevitably informed his passion for literature and learning. He became even a more famous hero after his death in 1586, as he died after sacrificing the last of his water supply to a dying soldier after the Battle of Zutphen.

Sidney was the first English poet to write an important sonnet sequence - a number of sonnets with a common idea uniting them. The originator was Petrarch whose *Canzoniere,* written about his love for Laura, serves as the model for Sydney's *Astrophel and Stella.* The sequence of 108 sonnets and 11 songs is believed to be autobiographical and it chronicles Sir Philip Sidney's love for his Stella, Penelope Devereux. She was betrothed to Sidney when she way young, but then married Lord Rich.

Astrophel and Stella holds pride of place as the most influential of the English sonnet tradition following Shakespeare. It includes 108 sonnets and 11 songs. The sequence relates the courtly love affair between Astrophel and Stella and their relationship is readable in their names. When 'Astrophel' is divided into its syllables it can be seen that the word is an amalgam of 'astro' which is derived from the Greek word *'astron'* meaning star, and *'philos'* which can be translated as 'loving' or 'love'. 'Stella', on the other hand, is derived from the Latin word *'stella'* meaning 'star'.

Following the Petrarchan tradition, it is Astrophel who has the center stage throughout the sonnets. Although his unrequited love and his suffering are rendered in reference to Stella's chastity, cruelty and rejection of his love, the limelight is on Astrophel, in accordance with the Petrarchan tradition. His engaging persona governs the whole of the sequence and the reader is engaged with Astrophel's feelings and reactions rather than Stella's.

The opening sonnet of *Astrophel and Stella* introduces the reader to the process of and the motivation for the composition of the sonnet sequence.

<center>I</center>

> Loving in truth, and fain in verse my love to show,
> That she, dear she, might take some pleasure of my pain,
> Pleasure might cause her read, reading might make her know,
> Knowledge might pity win, and pity grace obtain,
> I sought fit words to paint the blackest face of woe,
> Studying inventions fine her wits to entertain,
> Oft turning others' leaves, to see if thence would flow
> Some fresh and fruitful showers upon my sunburn'd brain.
> But words came halting forth, wanting invention's stay;
> Invention, Nature' s child, fled step-dame Study's blows;
> And other's feet still seem'd but strangers in my way.
> Thus great with child to speak and helpless in my throes,
> Biting my truant pen, beating myself for spite,
> "Fool," said my Muse to me, "look in thy heart, and write."

The poet creates the sonnet while he relates the challenges he had to face during the process. The very first line of the whole sonnet sequence identifies the location of Astrophel's love "in truth" and deals with his eagerness to express his true love in poetry. His motivation is to arouse the interest of the beloved so that she will take notice of the poet. He starts by studying the ancients and other poets before him, but to no avail. By doing so, the lover carefully establishes and follows a logical path, but finding that it will not lead him to his destination, he abandons it. He finds the source of his poetry only in his sincere heart devoted to loving Stella and all the frustrations that have been tormenting him disappear.

   In this opening sonnet Sidney foreshadows that he will not always follow the ways of other poets, including Petrarch, as they do not always serve his purpose. In sonnet 15, he addresses his fellow poets and writes:

> You that do dictionary's method bring
> Into your rimes, running in rattling rows;
> You that poor Petrarch's long deceased woes,
> With new-born sighs and denizen'd wit do sing,

Astrophels ambivalence towards Petrarchan tradition is foregrounded in the second sonnet, too. According to the Petrarchan tradition the lover is supposed to be struck with love at first sight. He writes:

> Not at first sight, nor with a dribbed shot,
> Love gave the wound which while I breathe will bleed:

> But known worth did in mine of time proceed,
> Till by degrees it had full conquest got.
> I saw, and liked: I liked, but loved not;

Astrophel puts a distance between himself and traditional lovers. Love is not a sudden blow for him. He does not yield to it unresistingly. On the contrary, Stella does not make much of an impression on him at first. Instead, he is involved slowly as love gradually creeps up on Astrophel, which is against Petrarchan conventions. Even when he yields, he refers to his reservations when he mentions his "lost libertie" into which he was "forced". The voice in the sonnet is controlled and cautious even resistant at times.

Astrophel's anti-Petrarchan streak runs throughout the sequence. Although Stella never relents and remains unattainable to the end, there is a hint of her favors in the sequence. This is something that is unthinkable in Petrarch. Another difference between the two poets is that Sidney's sonnets lack a sense of time. Petrarchan convention has meditations on the effects of time upon love, which are not used by Sidney (Antikacıoğlu 2007, 12). Hence, Astrophel remains ambivalent towards conventions, at times abandoning them, at others submitting to them like the use of the Petrarchan oxymorons in Sonnet VI "living deaths, deare wounds, fair stormes, and freesing fires".

In his book *Sidney s Poetic Development* Rudenstine writes that Astrophel "begins his courtship of Stella by staking out a strong claim for his own genuine feeling and original poetry. His effort is not to reject the Petrarchan mode out of hand but to find a personal style of his own within its broad confines, a style that will transform or transmute the inherited language of love in such a way as to betray the sign of his own 'inward touch'" and adds that "Astrophel must somehow discover his own voice for love, a style capable of expressing the powerful sincerity of his love".[1] Astrophel, therefore is on a quest for his own unique voice within the tradition.

One of the best known sonnets in Sidney's sequence is Sonnet 31 in which the moon is personified also contributes to the search for a unique voice as Astrophel meditates:

> With how sad step, Oh Moon, thou climb'st the skies!
> How silently, and with how wan a face!

The sonnet opens with an atmosphere of melancholy as the speaker projects his own sorrow and silence unto the moon. The gentle tone of the poem is quickly transformed in the following lines into anger and bitterness:

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[1] Neil L. Rudenstine, *Sidney's Poetic Development* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), 204, 219.

> What, may it be that even in heavenly place
> That busy archer his sharp arrows tries?
> Is constant love deemed there but want of wit?
> Are beauties there as proud as here they be?
> Do they above love to be loved and yet
> Those lovers scorn whom that love that possess?
> Do they call virtue there ungratefulness?

In Sonnet 39, the speaker's reflection of his own mood continues as he addresses sleep and celebrates the all-embracing nature of it. Just as the sun shines on all, so is sleep a release for all:

> Come sleep! Oh sleep, the certain knot of peace,
> The baiting place of wit, the balm of woe,
> The poor man's wealth, the prisoner''s release,
> The indifferent judge between the high and low.

Astrophel begs sleep to come so that he could find a way to reach his lover through dreams. This is how he turns his address to moon into a love poem for Stella when he tries to bribe sleep through access to the image of Stella.

The majority of sonnets in *Astrophel and Stella* are written in iambic pentameter, but there are some that are composed in alexandrines. Neither does Sidney always use the same rhyme scheme. At times the octave is the Petrarchan *abbaabba,* at other times it is *abababbab* or *ababbaba.* The sestets diverge from the tradition often as *cdcdee.* The poet almost always ends with a couplet on which the poem is balanced. This couplet is very un-Petrarchan and typically English.[2]

Astrophel and Stella can be seen as a kaleidoscope of human experience as it embraces:

> the role of narcissism and gullibility in our dealings with others; angst-ridden debates about the legitimacy of erotic desire and, indeed, the business of putting pen to paper; how we may construct identity through the axes of suffering and victimization as well as those of personal achievement and ambition; the relationship between the demands of faith and our involvement in sexual politics; the ways in which we exploit the textual and philosophical inheritances from the

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[2]   David Daiches. *A Critical History of English Literature* vol.1 (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1970), 196.

>past for our present needs; the competition between political, literary and erotic desire.[3]

In short, the sequence is a portrait of man. Sidney made the sonnet a vessel of expression for our moods. His reflective and emotional verse with personal voice and a constant sense of personal presence influenced English lyric poetry for generations to come.[4] He set the fashion for the next century.

2   Edmund Spenser: Amoretti

C. S. Lewis judged that "Spenser was not one of the great sonneteers", and there have been articles titled "An Apology for Spenser's *Amoretti*" in which the value of the sequence is questioned.[5] However, along with Sir Philip Sidney it was Edmund Spenser (1552-1598) who was extremely influential in the development of sonnet writing in England. Alexander Pope was a fan, too. He wrote: "Spenser has ever been a favourite poet to me: he is like a mistress, whose faults we see, but love her with them all".[6] Likewise, Charles Lamb coined the epithet 'the poets' poet' to refer to Spenser.

Earlier Spenser had written his 'Epithalamion' in which he celebrated his marriage to Elizabeth Boyle. Whether *Amoretti* celebrates his love for her is not known for certain. In any case, the 89 sonnets of *Amoretti* explore the courtship of two lovers. However, unlike *Astrophel and Stella,* this time flesh and spirit are not in opposition because Spenser did not believe in the separation of body and soul. Hence, *Amoretti* is about a love that is attained, harmonizing heavenly and earthly love. The sonnets tell the story of the poet's wooing of a mistress who at first rebuffed him, then relented and returned his love, and finally turned against him yet again.

The word 'amoretti' which means 'little cupids' in Italian can also be defined as "intimate little tokens of love made out of ancient materials deriving,

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[3]   Andrew Hiscock, "The Renaissance, 1485-1660", in *English Literature in Context.* ed. Paul Poplawski. 110-210. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 199-200.

[4]   Sosi Antikacıoğlu, *The Modern and Contemporary Sonnet in English.* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2007), 12-13.

[5]   Reed Way Dasenbrock, "The Petrarchan Context of Spenser's *Amoretti*" . PMLA 100 no.1 (1985), 38.

[6]   John R, Jr. Elliott, ed. *The Prince of Poets: Essays on Edmund Spenser.* (New York: New York University Press,1968), 13.

primarily, from Italy".[7] The sequence can be divided into three tokens of love in terms of thematic development. Sonnets 1 to 62 deal with unrequited love and the pursuit of the lady, sonnets 63 to 84 celebrate the lovers' happiness, sonnets 85 to 88 deal with the lover's brief separation, before their ultimate union in marriage.

The early sonnets of the sequence explore the speaker's role and nature as a poet and establish his position in relation to Petrarchan tradition. In the very first sonnet he identifies himself as both lover and poet when he says:

> Leaves, lines and rhymes, seek her to please alone,
> Whom if ye please, I care for other none.

In sonnet 22 a religious tone is added to his stance. He writes:

> There I to her as th' author of my bliss,
> Will build an altar to appease her ire.

Robert Kellogg argues that this triple identity (lover, poet and believer) is to be expected as "in its daily affairs our culture grants to three kinds of imagination (the Renaissance would have called them three kinds of madness) a special license to express their visions of things inaccessible to the sense of ordinary men. These three kinds of imagination are the artistic, the erotic, and the religious".[8]

In sonnet XV Spenser employs his role as a poet and a lover through the use of conventional compliment to the lady. The poem starts with an echo of the spirit of travel and expansion:

> Ye tradeful Merchants, that with weary toyle,
> do seeke most pretious things to make your gain;
> and both the Indias of their treasures spolie,
> what needeth you to seeke so far in vaine?

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[7] Louis L. Martz, "The *Amoretti:* Most Goodly Temperature", in *The Prince of Poets: Essays on Edmund Spenser.* ed. John R. Elliott, Jr. 121-138. (New York: New York University Press, 1968), 128.

[8] Robert Kellogg, "Thought's Astonishment and the Dark Conceits of Spenser's *Amoretti",* in *The Prince of Poets: Essays on Edmund Spenser.* ed. John R. Elliott, Jr. 139-151. (New York: New York University Press, 1968), 140.

The following two quatrains identify each part of the beloved's body as being more valuable than the riches of the east. However, it is the couplet which introduces a different idea with a surprising effect:

> But that which fairest is, but few behold,
> her mind adornd with vertues manifold.

This reference to the lady's mind is one of the many we will come across throughout *Amoretti*. Spencer's lady has a strong character, with her "deep wit" (Sonnet 43), "her gentle wit, and virtuous mind" (Sonnet 79), her "words so wise" (Sonnet 81). The picture that the poet draws is that of a woman who has a definite and attractive character. Compared to the ladies of other sonnet sequences Spenser's lady is not an unattainable saint but a woman who has been conceived more realistically. Most importantly, she is allowed to speak and act. In contrast with the Petrarchan tradition, Spenser also expressed his belief that married love was the combination of spiritual and carnal love, and that it is necessary for the continuation of mankind.[9]

A metaphorical marriage of the lover and the beloved takes place in sonnet 67 when the poet merges the identities of man and woman and uses a very conventional conceit of 'deer in the love hunting tradition':

> Like as a huntsman, after weary chase,
> Seeing the game from him escaped away,
> Sits down to rest him in some shady place,
> With panting hounds beguiled of their pray:

This typical Petrarchan comparison, however, is immediately rebuked and the sonnet reverses expectations in the second quatrain:

> So, after long pursuit and vain assay,
> When I all weary had the chase forsook,
> The gentle dear returned the self-same way,
> Thinking to quench her thirst at the next brook.

The reader expects the obvious parallel between the lover and the exhausted huntsman to dominate the next quatrain, too. However, this time power relations between the first-person narrator and his object of desire are turned upside down:

> There she, beholding me with milder look,

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9   Antikacıoğlu, *The Modern and Contemporary Sonnet in English*, 13.

> Sought not to fly, but fearless still did bide:
> Till I in hand her yet half trembling took,
> And with her own goodwill her firmly tied.
> Strange thing, me seemed, to see a beast so wild,
> So goodly won, with her own will beguiled.

The reader cannot help but ask: Who is the hunter, who is the hunted? It is not "the gentle dear" who is "half-trembling", but the hunter. As Henderson argues "The sonnet alters convention by mingling the two parties grammatically and thereby merging their sensibilities. ... *Amoretti* 67 is fascinated by doubling and gender-bending, tensions between masculine action and passive receptivity to the good, between courtly love schema and the intimacy of marital love, and between female chastity (so fetishized in   this period) and fully realized sexuality".[10]

So far, it has been argued that the poet's view of love in *Amoretti* deviates from the traditional Petrarchan sonnets. Even so; the sequence is still bound by the convention as the poet goes through the required suffering.

Another Petrarchan theme employed by Spenser is that of the poet rendering his beloved immortal by his verse, as in sonnet 75:

> One day I wrote her name upon the strand
> But came the waves and washed it away:
> Again I wrote it with a second hand,
> But came the tide, and made my pains his pray.
> Vain man, said she, that does in vain assay
> A mortal thing so to immortalize!
> For I my self shall like to this decay,
> And eek my name be wiped out likewise.
> Not so (quod I) let baser things devise
> To die in dust, but you shall live by fame:
> My verse your virtues rare shall eternize,
> And in the heavens write your glorious name;
> Where, whenas death shall all the world subdue,
> Our love shall live, and later life renew.

While the lady repeatedly talks about the futility of trying to go against death, the poet does not agree with her. He argues that he can conquer mutability and that he can control the effects of time through his art. Fickleness of future will

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[10]   Diana E. Henderson, "The Sonnet, Subjectivity and Gender." in *The Cambridge Companion to the Sonne*t. eds. A.D. Cousins and Peter Howarth.(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 386.

not be able to touch them. Constancy will be achieved through his art as the poet eternalizes his beloved in his poetry.

This dichotomy of change versus being free of change is a theme that Spenser explored in his poetry. The whole poem grows out of the first quatrain which presents in simple language the timeless situation of a man in love writing a woman' s name in the sand and watching the waves erase it. The second quatrain introduces the lady and she unexpectedly speaks and reminds the poet of her mutability. The third quatrain introduces the idea if immortality through poetry. The whole argument is brought to a conclusion with the final couplet. Each quatrain rises to a higher sphere of meaning than the preceding one. The second and third quatrains spiral up out of the first and the conclusion rises even higher. The transcendence to a universal idea rather than being limited by a subjective emotional response is a feature of the *Amoretti* that gives the series one kind of unity.[11]

With regards to form, Spenser devised his own version of sonnet called Spenserian sonnet which is more restricting compared to its Petrarchan predecessor as it is made up of interlacing rhymes *abab bcbc cdcd,* and a concluding rhyming couplet of *ee.*

3   Lady Mary Wroth: Pamphilia to Amphilanthus

In a sonnet signed with the note 'To the noble Lady, the Lady Mary Wroth', Ben Jonson wrote "I ... / Since I exscribe your sonnets, am become / A better lover and much better poet' (Bolam 2003, 257). The poem was dedicated to the first Englishwoman to publish an original complete sonnet sequence. Wroth's range of writing was very wide and she is also thought to be the first woman to write a dramatic comedy titled *Love's Victory.*

In 1621 Wroth's controversial 558 page prose romance, *The Countess of Montgomery's Urania,* appeared with an appendix of separately numbered, 48 page sequence of sonnets and songs, entitled *Pamphilia to Amphilanthus.* 'Pamphilia', the fictional writer of the sonnet sequence and 'Amphilanthus', her inconstant lover who first appear as characters in *Urania,* and there are examples of their poetry in it. These sonnets are linked to the prose romance but even so they can be read separately by themselves.[12] The published sequence contained 83 sonnets and 20 songs. There is a single complete

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[11]   Waldo F. McNeir, "An Aplogy for Spenser's *Amoretti".* in *Essential Articles for the Study of Edmond Spenser.* ed. A.C.Hamilton. 524-533. (Connecticut: Archon Books, 1972), 528-9.

[12]   Robyn Bolam, "The Heart of the Labyrinth: Mary Wrath's *Pamphilia to Amphilanthus".* in *A Companion to English Renaissance Literature and Culture*, ed. Michael Hattaway (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 257.

manuscript, neatly copied in Wroth's own hand, which is now kept at the Folger Shakespeare Library.

Lady Mary Wroth (1586 or 7-1653) was born Mary Sidney. She belonged to a prominent literary family, known for its patronage of the arts. Sir Philip Sidney was her uncle and she was inevitably influenced by his works, particularly *Astrophel and Stella.* She was educated informally with household tutors under the guidance of her mother. In 1604 she married Sir Robert Wroth. He never shared his wife's love of reading and writing and they were never happy as their temperaments were fundamentally different. By 1613 she had begun her writing career. In 1614 her husband died leaving her with massive debts. Although she was briefly famous, the scandal caused by her prose romance meant that she fell out of favour and not much is known of her later years.

Wroth's choice of names for her protagonists mirrors her uncles' sequence. 'Pamphilia' means 'all-loving' in Greek, whereas 'Amphilanthus' who is her unfaithful lover and cousin, means 'lover of two'. The collection describes the desire felt by Pamphilia for Amphilanthus and, just as it was discussed in the previous sections, it can be read in biographical terms by referring to Wroth's passionate relationship with her married and philandering cousin William Herbert, Earl of Pembroke. As a young widow she had two children by him.

Whether it is intentional or not, in some sonnets Wroth follows the practice of punning in her own name as Wroth / worth. For example in Sonnet 8 of the third part of the sequence titled 'Crown of Sonnets' we read:

> He that shuns love doth love himself the less
> And cursed he whose spirit not admires
> The worth of love, where endless blessedness
> Reigns, and commands, maintained by heavenly fires
> Made of virtue, joined by truth, blown by desires
> Strengthened by worth.

In this sonnet the persona is meditating upon the role love plays in the development of the self. As the name Pamphilia suggests, to love is to be loved and love brings self-esteem.[13]

The sonnet sequence clearly belongs to Pamphilia and her musings about her love. Amphilanthus is rarely addressed and is never physically present. Hence, the helpless lover is not the traditional male. Neither is the object of desire has got anything to do with the conventional Petrarchan beloved. Unlike the figures of beloved in Sidney and Spenser, Amphilanthus is never given a voice. He is introduced only as the object of her desire. Although Pamphilia

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[13]   Bolam, "The Heart of the Labyrinth", 260.

does not use the traditional blazons to describe the physical attributes of Amphilanthus, when she does have the need to talk about his eyes, for instance, she refers to his eyes as "two stars of heaven". She pulls the Petrarchan trope inside out when she uses such cliches in reference to a man.[14]

Wroth becomes "the first English writer to reverse the traditional gender roles of lover and beloved in a complete sonnet collection".[15] In her sequence Pamphilia is not the unobtainable and depersonified object of the male poet. This time it is the lady who desires and expresses this desire in a voice of her own. In Wroth's hands she is transformed from a "breaker into a maker of songs".[16]

Wroth's most memorable images are those that she creates through figurative language like the following lines depicting the drama of rejection in Sonnet 22.

> Like to the Indians scorched with the sun,
> The sun which they do as their God adore
> So am I us'd by love, for ever more
> I worship him, less favours I have won.

A favourite image for Wroth is that of labyrinths. By the end of the sequence, after the speaker has tried every other way to win her beloved, she cannot find a way out of the metaphorical labyrinth of love. Therefore, she opts for a spiritual move upward out of the labyrinth. Her final resolution is declared in the last sonnet as follows:

> Leave the discourse of Venus and her son
> To young beginners, and their brains inspire
> With stories of great Love, and from that fire,
> Get heat to write the fortunes they have won.

The woman transformed herself during her quest and became an inspiration for other writers and lovers. The new muse is a woman's poetic art, rather than the

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[14] Bolam, "The Heart of the Labyrinth", 261.

[15] Naomi J. Miller, "Rewriting Lyric Fiction: The Role of the Lady in Lady Mary Wroth's *Pamphilia to Amphilanthus.*" in *The Renaissance Englishwoman in Print : Counterbalancing the Canon.* Ed. Anne M. Hasselkom and Betty S. Travitsky. (Amherst: Massachusetts UP, 1990), 295.

[16] Ibid., 298.

woman herself.[17] She gives up her unattainable muse in favour of another which promises so much more.

One of the best definitions of a sonnet is that it is "a little poem with a big heart".[18] Sir Philip Sidney, Edmund Spenser and Lady Mary Wroth are three sonneteers who explored the emotions of the human heart in the confines of the little poem.

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[17]   Bolam, "The Heart of the Labyrinth", 265.

[18]   A.D.Cousins and Peter Howarth, eds. *The Cambridge Companion to The Sonnet*, 46.

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Francis Bacon: Knowledge is Power[1]

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Abstract

If Renaissance philosophy constitutes a transition between medieval theology and modern humanism, then Francis Bacon (1561-1626) represents the Renaissance's great prophet of modernity. His work offers the earliest and most eloquent statement of science, not as the contemplation of eternal truths, but as an instrument for achieving mastery over nature. Bacon's writings, which include works in natural and moral philosophy, political history, and legal reform, suggest his commitment to science as a comprehensive, cooperative, and practical endeavor, one articulated as early as 1605 in *Of the Advancement of Learning*, the most accessible of Bacon's books, and one of his few major works to be written originally in English. His philosophical project aims at nothing less than a new classification of knowledge, embracing the theoretical and the practical sciences alike, and a new method for collecting it. The "Baconian Method" casts itself as a new modus operandi for the understanding, one that steers it on a middle path between the rational and the experimental. For this method to succeed, however, it must overcome the dogmas and prejudices of human culture and human nature: what Bacon, in *Of the Advancement of Learning*, calls the "Idols which beset men's minds." Bacon's doctrine of the idols is arguably his most famous piece of writing; not because of the theory it offers, but because of the way in which it communicates it: through a series of memorable tropes and arresting images. In general, critical discussions of the idols fail to take them seriously, treating them as gaudy ornaments, figures of speech for the real matter at hand: the launching of a scientific or inductive method. According to the critics, in the doctrine of the idols Bacon the poet eclipses Bacon the philosopher. It is as if to take this doctrine seriously would be to succumb to the idolatrous force of its seductive imagery, and thereby abandon the true path of "science." And yet it is worth taking the doctrine of the idols seriously: as philosophy, as well as poetry.

Keywords: Bacon, Aristotle, science, experimental method, induction, syllogism, idol, dogma

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Francis Bacon: Bilgi Güçtür

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Özet

Eğer Rönesans felsefesi ortaçağ teolojisi ve modern hümanizm arasındaki geçişi oluşturuyor dersek, o zaman Francis Bacon (1561-1626) da Rönesans'ın müthiş öncüsüdür. Bacon'da bilimin en güzel ifadesi yer alır, sadece evrensel gerçeklerin yansımaları olduğu için değil, doğaya hakim olabilmek adına bir ışık oluşturduğu için. Bacon'un çalışmaları bilime karşı ciddi bir adanmışlık içerir; yapıtları doğa ve ahlak felsefesi, politik tarih, ve hukuki reform konularını ele alır. Bacon'un bilime olan bağlılığı kapsamlı, müşterek ve uygulanabilir bir yaklaşım sağlar; 1605 tarihi kadar erken bir zamanda yazılmış *Of the Advancement of Learning* eseri buna iyi bir örnektir ve orijinal dili İngilizcede yazılmış az sayıda eserinden biridir. Bacon'un felsefi projesi bilgiye yeni bir sınıflandırma sağlamaktır, ve bunu yaparken de hem teorik hem pratik bilimleri dahil eder. Bacon metodu denilen metot rasyonel olan ile deneysel olan arasındaki yolu temsil eder. Bu metodun başarılı olabilmesi için Bacon'un *Of the Advancement of Learning* eserinde "İnsanoğlunun aklına yerleşen putlar" olarak hitap ettiği insan doğasının ve kültürünün dogma ve önyargılarından arınması gerekmektedir. Bacon'un putlar (idoller) doktrini en önemli çalışması sayılır. Bunun sebebi ise sunduğu kuram değil de daha çok bu kuramları aktarılış biçimidir: unutulması mümkün olmayan mecazları ve etkileyici imgeleriyle. Genel olarak eleştirel tartışmalar Bacon'un putlarını yeterince ciddiye almaz; bilimsel bir metodun doğuşundan ziyade gösterişli dil kullanımları olarak algılanır. Eleştirmenlere göre putlar doktrininde şair Bacon, filozof Bacon'u gölgede bırakır. Sanki putlar kuramını ciddiye almak demek bilime uzanan gerçek yoldan sapmak ve imgelerin cazibeli gücüne kapılmak demek. Halbuki putlar doktrini hem felsefe olarak hem şiir olarak ciddiye almaya değer.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bacon, bilim, deneysel metod, başlatım (indüksiyon), kıyas, idol, put, dogma

Introduction: Knowledge is Power

If Renaissance philosophy constitutes a transition between a medieval perspective that is essentially theological (with God at its center), and a modern worldview that is largely humanist (man in the place where God used to be), then Francis Bacon (1561-1626) represents the Renaissance's great prophet of modernity. No student of the period can afford to ignore his work, which offers the earliest and most eloquent statement of science, not as the contemplation of eternal truths, but as an instrument for achieving mastery over nature. To the extent we believe that "knowledge is power,"[2] we are the descendants of Bacon.[3]

All knowledge is power. It is worth dwelling, for a moment, on Bacon's career, which seems a lifelong effort to prove that maxim true: a splendid illustration of the *vita activa* (the *active life*), or more precisely, the *vita activa* as part and parcel with the *vita contemplativa* (the *contemplative life*).[4] Bacon would have never regarded himself as merely an author: his writings—moral, legal, literary, historical, philosophical—are an integral part of his work as a public servant and politician. His career as a lawyer and parliamentarian was a long and illustrious one. After a steady rise within the ranks of power, the succession of James I guarantees Bacon's political ascendancy: he is made Solicitor-General in 1607, Attorney General in 1613 and, in 1618, Lord Chancellor—the highest political position in the realm. In that same year Bacon is knighted, and bestowed the title Baron Ferula; in 1621 he is made Viscount St Alban. But that same year, which represents the apex of Bacon's career, also marks Bacon's fall from grace: charged with corruption, he is imprisoned (albeit briefly) in the Tower of London, and forced to renounce public office. Yet neither Bacon's abrupt turn of fortunes nor his retreat from the public realm diminishes the prodigious output of publications which continue to flow from his pen.

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[2] A favorite aphorism of the *pragmatic* philosophers. *Pragmatism*: a branch of philosophy, founded by American philosophers Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), William James (1842-1910), and John Dewey (1859-1952). Pragmatism argues, in essence, that truth is something to be measured by way of practical consequences in the real world.

[3] "Knowledge is power" is a rendering of the Latin "scientia potestas est"; although nowhere explicitly found in his writings, the aphorism is almost universally attributed to Bacon.

[4] A venerable distinction in classical philosophy, made newly relevant by German philosopher Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) in *The Human Condition* (1958), where Arendt champions the *vita activa* over the *vita contemplativa*.

Thus the vast diversity of Bacon's writings, which include works in natural and moral philosophy, political history, and legal reform, is not just a sign of a man, typical of the time, interested in many things: it is a function of Bacon's commitment to science as a comprehensive, cooperative, and practical endeavor.[5] That endeavor is articulated as early as 1605 in *Of the Advancement of Learning*, the most accessible of Bacon's books, and one of his few major works (along with *The Essays* [1597; final edition 1625] and the *New Atlantis* [1627]) to be written originally in English.[6] (That the bulk of Bacon's writings, like those of his contemporaries, are in Latin, suggests the extent to which humanist culture remained closely bound to the classical past and to the authority of the Church: Latin, after all, was the language of both.) If the most cogent statement of this endeavor is the *De augmentis scientiarum* (*Partitions of the Sciences*; 1623; a translation, in essence, of *Of the Advancement of Learning*), its most complete and comprehensive demonstration is the *Novum organum* (*The New Method*; 1620), the title of which refers back to Aristotle's *Organon*, comprising the ancient Greek philosopher's six works on logic[7]— thereby suggesting at once Bacon's investment in classical philosophy, and his intention to supersede it. The *Novum organum* is undoubtedly Bacon's most influential text; its complete title (in English) is *New Organon: True Directions Concerning the Interpretation of Nature*. Here the old Aristotelian logic, with its special emphasis on reason, is to be replaced by the new Baconian logic, which partners reason to experience – both now essential in the effort to understand, and master, nature. Note that both the *De augmentis* and the *Novum organum* are, in fact, only the first two parts of a larger, never completed work, the magisterial *Instauratio magna* (the *Great Instauration*; *instauration* meaning *renovation* or *restoration*), the very title of which suggests the vast scope of Bacon's philosophical project, which aims at nothing less than a new

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[5] Peltonen sees in Bacon's work the triumph of "operative" over "contemplative" science (i.e., metaphysics) (Markku Peltonen, "Introduction," in *The Cambridge Companion to Bacon*, ed. Peltonen [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 2). Philosophy is no longer to be a speculative enterprise, but a utilitarian one.

[6] Even prior to *Of the Advancement of Learning*, however, in a work written in the early 1590s, "Of Tribute or Giuing [*sic*] That which Is Due," Bacon praises recent technological innovations with eminently practical applications, from artillery to the printing press; in a literary masque from the same period Bacon lauds "the conquest of the works of nature" which such inventions make possible (qtd. in Peltonen, "Introduction," 5).

[7] Namely: *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics* and *On Sophistical Refutations*.

classification of knowledge—one joining the theoretical and the practical sciences—and a new method for collecting it.[8]

The Baconian Method

The "Baconian Method" represents itself as a new *modus operandi* for the understanding, one that steers it on a middle path between the theoretical and the practical, or the rational and the experimental. As Bacon proclaims in the preface to *De augmentis*, "Our method is continually to dwell among things soberly . . . to establish for ever a true and legitimate union between the experimental and rational faculty."[9] But what does this mean, exactly? In the *Novum organum* Bacon explains:

> Those who have handled sciences have been either men of experiment or men of dogmas. The men of experiment are like the ant; they only collect and use: the reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance. But the bee takes a middle course; it gathers its material from the flowers of the garden and the field, but transforms and digests it by a power of its own. Not unlike this is the true business of philosophy; for it neither relies solely or chiefly on the powers of the mind, nor does it take the matter which it gathers from natural history and mechanical experiments and lay it up in the memory whole as it finds it; but lays it up in the understanding altered and digested. Therefore from a closer and purer league between these two faculties, the experimental and the rational (such as has never yet been made), much may be hoped. (4: 92-93)[10]

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[8] Note the frontispiece to the 1640 edition of the *De augmentis*, which depicts a ship sailing through the pillars of Hercules, the columns at the Strait of Gibraltar which were long imagined to mark the limits of the civilized world. Bacon is writing, after all, in the latter part of the Age of Discovery, and thus it is not surprising, perhaps, that his program for a new science is represented as an audacious venture into uncharted realms. Below this illustration appears the following inscription: *Multi pertransibunt et augebitur scientia* ("Many will pass beyond and knowledge will increase"). The image of this frontispiece is reproduced at the beginning of *The Cambridge Companion to Bacon* (Peltonen, xviii).

[9] Trans. Bohn; qtd. in Basel Willey, "Bacon and the Rehabilitation of Nature," in *The Seventeenth-Century Background: Studies in the Thought of the Age in Relation to Poetry and Religion* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1955), 33.

[10] *The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. and trans. James Spedding, Robert L. Ellis and Douglas D. Heath (London: Longman, 1857-74, 14 vols.). All references to Bacon are by volume and page number of this edition, unless otherwise stated.

This *new method*, this *novum organum*, can be reduced, in essence, to the principle of *induction*. The *Novum organum*, Bacon declares in a letter written in 1620 to James I, "is no more but a new logic, teaching to invent and judge by induction (as finding syllogism incompetent for sciences of nature), and thereby to make philosophy and sciences both more true and more active" (14: 119-20). Bacon's championing of induction is inseparable from his embrace of both experimental and speculative philosophy. Induction may be defined, after all, as a form of thinking which proceeds from particulars to generalities; as opposed to *deduction*, which moves (as in the Aristotelian syllogism) *inferentially*, from generalities to particulars.

Some clarification is required, here, regarding the reference to the *syllogism*, which Bacon roundly rejects as a legitimate instrument of scientific knowledge. For Aristotle, as for his followers (including the medieval *scholastics*, whom Bacon condemns, in the citation above, as "men of dogmas"), the syllogism constituted the essential unit of deductive reasoning: an infallible method for arriving at irrefutable conclusions. As Aristotle puts it in the *Prior Analytics*: "A syllogism is discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so."[11] The traditional Aristotelian syllogism (sometimes referred to as the *categorical syllogism*) is comprised of three propositions: two premises which, if true, lead necessarily to a conclusion. Thus, to use a famous example: (a) All men are mortal; (b) Socrates is a man; therefore, (c) Socrates is mortal. For Bacon, the syllogism stood for the fatal flaw in the logic inherited from classical antiquity and dogmatically received by the medieval schoolmen: the excessive reliance on speculative reasoning independent of empirical observation.

Over and against this old, deductive logic, Bacon's new method champions *induction*. Inductive reasoning relies, as the ant does, on the careful collection of empirical data. It does so, however, not for its own sake, but in order to spin, spider-like, an ever more expansive and comprehensive web of knowledge. To bee or not to bee, then, that is the question (if I may be allowed a very bad Shakespearean pun); for only the bee both borrows its raw material from nature and transforms that material into something of a higher order. Bacon's scientist begins with the raw data of experience; but his goal is the progressive understanding of nature's first and most fundamental principles.

These are, in effect, the principles Plato referred to as the universal *forms* or *ideas*. But for Plato the knowledge of such forms or ideas was something to be won entirely through speculative means, in other words, through the operations of the intellect independent of the senses. Indeed, for Plato, the senses could

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[11]   1.1, 24b18-20; trans. A. J. Jenkinson, in Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 66.

only be an obstacle to such knowledge. Plato's student Aristotle, on the other hand, grounded Plato's rationalist philosophy (i.e., a philosophy based on reason) in the experience provided by the senses, without which knowledge of first principles or causes was impossible. But Aristotle's philosophy remains "corrupted" by its reliance on "logic"; that is to say, a tendency towards speculative reasoning (evidenced above all in the syllogism) divorced from the observation of nature. For almost a thousand years Aristotle's philosophy was given the status of gospel—except where it was contradicted by the Gospels themselves. It was against this dogmatism (a dogmatism Bacon regularly associates, we have seen, with medieval scholasticism) that Bacon is reacting in his efforts to fashion a new kind of scientific method. More specifically, Bacon believed Aristotelian logic was too precipitate in its leap from empirical particulars to general principles; Baconian logic will rectify this tendency. This is the point of the following passage from the *Novum organum*:

> The understanding must not however be allowed to jump and fly from particulars to remote axioms and of almost the highest generality (such as the first principles, as they are called, of arts and things), and taking stand upon them as truths that cannot be shaken, proceed to prove and frame the middle axioms by reference to them; which has been the practice hitherto; the understanding being not only carried that way by a natural impulse, but also by the use of syllogistic demonstration trained and inured to it. But then, and only then, may we hope well of the sciences, when in a just scale of ascent, and by successive steps not interrupted or broken, we rise from particulars to lesser axioms; and then to middle axioms, one above the other; and last of all to the most general . . . The understanding must not therefore be supplied with wings, but rather hung with weights, to keep it from leaping and flying. (4: 97)

In Aristotle the marriage between rationalism and empiricism was incomplete; Bacon will finish, now, what Aristotle only started. Bacon is sometimes regarded as one of the founding fathers of modern empiricism (remember the image of the bee); but he is as critical of empiricism (the method of the ant) as an absolute principle as he is of rationalism (the method of the spider). This is a point, one has to admit, almost lost in the sheer power of the poetry by which Bacon expresses it (as in the conceit of the understanding laden with weights rather than lifted by wings). This is not the last time we will see Bacon as a victim of his own rhetoric.

It is above all in this refusal of dogmatism, a tendency towards skepticism and self-criticism, that Bacon shows himself to be a modern thinker. For if Baconian induction relies on the observation of natural phenomena, it also acknowledges that the essential instrument required for carrying out that

observation—namely, the human mind—is unreliable, and prone to error. Hence the lineage often drawn between Bacon and the great British empirical skeptics such as John Locke and David Hume.

Meanwhile the end of this new science, like its methods of inquiry, is at once theoretical *and* practical: philosophy, as Bacon proclaims in the *De augmentis*, is now to attend to *both* "the Inquiry of Causes" (a speculative matter) *and* "the Production of Effects" (one that can be studied empirically) (4: 346).

Science as Religion

The success of this new science depends upon the eradication of old errors: "false notions," as Bacon puts it in the *Novum organum* (4: 53), which prevent the mind from achieving a correct understanding of the external world. In the *Novum organum* Bacon calls these false notions *idols*, implicitly suggesting that the obstacles to the new science constitute a form of heresy to what is, in effect, a new religion. Although Bacon everywhere condemns the medieval scholastics (as when he rails against the "Schoolmen" in his essay "Of Superstition,"[12] Bacon's philosophical program constitutes less a break with medieval scholasticism than its revision. Bacon's science, ironically enough, is presented by his contemporaries, and, indeed, presents itself as a new kind of faith or mystery, articulated with all the fervor of religious discourse.[13]

Consider the ode, "To the Royal Society" by the great Restoration poet Abraham Cowley (1618-67).[14] This poem was written, significantly, as an introduction to Thomas Sprat's 1667 *History of the Royal Society*—an institution, we will see, with which Bacon was closely associated in the public imagination. Cowley took an active interest in the new science; he himself was a member of the Royal Society, having joined in its founding year (1662); the previous year he had already published a short polemic entitled *Advancement of Experimental Philosophy*. We should hardly be surprised, then, that Bacon is cast in the role of the hero of "To the Royal Society"; what is worth remarking here is the way that heroism is lent religious trappings. Bacon is celebrated as a second Moses who vanquishes the "Monstrous God" (line 50), "Autority" (*sic*) (41) and, "like Moses, led us forth at last" (93) out of the "barren Wilderness" (94) of "Errors" (89) to the "promis'd Land" (96) of truth.

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[12]   Bacon, *The Essays*, ed. John Pitcher (London: Penguin, 1985), 111.

[13]   By the middle of the 17th century, Achsah Guibbory writes in "Imitation and Originality: Cowley and Bacon's Vision of Progress," Bacon's "plan for advancing science had become virtually a 'second gospel'" (*Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900* 29, no.1 [Winter, 1989], 99).

[14]   Abraham Cowley, *The English Writings of Abraham Cowley*, ed. A. R. Waller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1905-1906, 2 vols.), 1: 448-53.

But there is more at work here than a reflexive reliance on traditional religious rhetoric. The new science does not oppose itself to the old religion; on the contrary, Bacon's experimental program is represented as a way of ratifying Scripture and the divine order. This is a point made repeatedly in Bacon's work, as in the essay "Of Atheism," where Bacon famously asserts:

> It is true that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion: for while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no further; but when it beholdeth the chain of them, confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity.[15]

If Bacon can opine, in *The Advancement of Learning*, "that God worketh nothing in nature but by second causes" (3: 267), then to attend to such causes is to affirm the existence of the divine as *first cause*—precisely how Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), greatest of the scholastic philosophers, had defined God, in classic Aristotelian fashion, in the *Summa theologica* (1265-1274).[16] Science and religion, then, for Bacon, are less enemies than uneasy allies. The world studied by the scientist is still God's creation, a manifestation of his glory. The very goal of the New Science, and the power it promises man, suggests a long-awaited fulfillment of the divine order; thus in *Of the Interpretation of Nature*, the language of which is everywhere suffused with religious imagery and fervor, Bacon declares that "the true ends of knowledge" are "a restitution and reinvesting . . . of man to the sovereignty and power . . . which he had in his first state of creation" (3: 222).

Philosophy as Poetry

But, like Moses, Bacon leads his people to the promised land but cannot enter it. Bacon, as Cowley expresses it in "To the Royal Society," "Did on the very Border stand / Of the blest promis'd Land, / And from the Mountains Top of his Exalted Wit, / Saw it himself, and shew'd us it. / But Life did never to one Man allow / Time to Discover Worlds, and Conquer too" (95-100). Bacon's efforts to construct a grand philosophical scheme, one that would supersede the venerable systems of antiquity, remain inchoate. The last three parts of the grandiose six-part plan proposed in the *Instauratio magna* are never completed; part six, the very goal towards which the first five parts are intended to lead, the

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[15] Bacon, *The Essays*, 108.

[16] Culminating achievement of scholastic philosophy, the *Summa theologica* constituted nothing less than an effort to reconcile philosophy and faith, Aristotle and Holy Scripture.

realization of the "New Philosophy," or "Active Science" is, Bacon tells us in the "Plan of the Work" of *The Great Instauration*, "a thing both above my strength and beyond my hopes" (4: 32).

It follows that Bacon's real impact upon the development of a new philosophical method is debatable. The Baconian method is largely ignored by the British empiricists, just as it is by the Continental rationalists (philosophers, such as Descartes, who seek truth not in experience but in the mind). Bacon's legacy, in the end, is less a new logic than a new *rhetoric* of science.[17] Bacon is, in short, not so much the theorist of modern science as its *propagandist*, or *prophet* or *poet*.[18] Early on in his career Bacon understood the importance of rhetoric as an instrument to steer reason; it was, after all, an essential component of the medieval liberal arts curriculum still being taught (in Latin, of course) at Cambridge (where Bacon was a student from 1573-75),[19] even if that curriculum had been greatly influenced of late by the new humanism, the *studia humanitatis* (literally, the *study of the humanities*). But Bacon probably did not want to be remembered, as he was during his own lifetime, as "our English Tully";[20] he was striving to be England's Aristotle, not its Cicero.[21]

And yet, in *Of the Advancement of Learning* Bacon denounces those who prefer words to ideas; he adheres to the old classical distinction subsuming *verba* (*words*) to *res* (*subject* or *matter*). Words are merely a vehicle, then, for expressing ideas. In the *Novum organum*, in a passage commonly referred to as the *idols of the mind*, Bacon (long before Locke) rails against the "Idols of the Market-place," errors and delusions "imposed by words on the understanding" (4: 61). (One of Bacon's complaints against the scholastics is, we know, their

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[17] "For many years lauded as one of the 'fathers' of modern science . . . Bacon's status as a 'scientist' was later reassessed, and . . . interest in his work shifted from his scientific legacy to his power as a rhetorician" (Susan Bruce, "Introduction," *Three Early Modern Utopias: Utopia, New Atlantis, and The Isle of Pines, ed. Susan Bruce [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999], xxix).

[18] "If we can no longer estimate Bacon the scientist very highly . . . justice has certainly yet to be done to him as a writer" (Brian Vickers, *Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968], 2).

[19] A curriculum comprised of the *trivium* (i.e., logic, grammar and rhetoric), the *quadrivium* (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music), and philosophy divided into its three major branches (metaphysical, natural and moral).

[20] "Tully"; that is, Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC), Roman orator and statesman. Peltonen argues that the sobriquet was a way of referring not only to Bacon's eloquence, but his preference for the *via activa* (Peltonen, "Introduction," 14).

[21] For some he was England's true Shakespeare. It is perhaps a testament to his eloquence and rhetorical prowess that, beginning in the nineteenth century, Bacon is periodically "unmasked" as the "true" author of Shakespeare's plays.

excessive reliance on syllogistic logic, deductive forms of reasoning which Bacon sees as purely linguistic mechanisms.) It is one of the great ironies of Bacon's career, then, that he is known more for the force of his arguments than their substance. Bacon's *idols of the mind* is arguably his most famous piece of writing: not because it propounds a new theory, however, but because it is an undeniably powerful piece of imagery; a rhetorical *tour de force*.

The Doctrine of the Idols

Let us examine Bacon's *doctrine of the idols* a little more closely. For the "Idols of the Market-place" are, Bacon asserts in the *New organum*, but one of "four classes of Idols which beset men's minds" (4: 53): the three others being the "Idols of the Tribe," the "Idols of the Cave" and the "Idols of the Theatre." Sachiko Kusukawa calls Bacon's idols "prejudices and preconceptions of the human mind,"[22] but they represent very distinct modalities of prejudices and preconceptions. The Idols of the Tribe refers to the innate deficiencies in the operation of the human intellect, flaws that constitute an inalienable aspect of human nature: "human understanding," as Bacon puts it in the *Novum organum*, " is like a false mirror" of reality (4: 54). The Idols of the Cave, conversely, refers to preconceptions purely idiosyncratic in nature: they are the "idols of the individual man" (4: 54). The Idols of the Theatre, finally, denote those errors and misconceptions which have been inculcated through the unexamined "dogmas of philosophies"; Bacon calls them Idols of the Theatre because these dogmas "are but so many stage-plays, representing worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic fashion" (4: 55).

In general, critical discussions of the idols (which also figure largely in Bacon's *Of the Advancement of Learning*) fail to take them seriously, treating them instead as gaudy ornaments, mere images, figures of speech for the real matter at hand: Bacon's launching of the scientific or inductive method ("The formation of ideas and axioms by true induction is no doubt the proper remedy to be applied for the keeping off and clearing away of idols" [4: 54]). In such readings, in effect, Bacon the poet eclipses Bacon the philosopher.[23] It is as if to

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[22] Sachiko Kusukawa, "Bacon's Classification of Knowledge," in *The Cambridge Companion to Bacon*, ed. Peltonen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 63

[23] More generally, such readings betray a certain distrust, within the practice of philosophy, or more generally theory itself, of the image, of the *conceit*, as it were, within the *concept*. This is precisely the distrust that French philosopher Jacques Derrida (for example, in "White Mythology"), and before him German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (in works such as *On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense*), identified as the signature anxiety of all philosophy: i.e., the fear of its own opacity or textuality or poeticity.

take these images seriously would be to succumb to their own idolatrous force, and thereby abandon the true path of "science."[24]

And yet it is worth taking the doctrine of the idols seriously (that is, as philosophy, as well as poetry). Let us consider, for example, the extent to which Bacon's figures depend on the allegorical rehabilitation of recognizable classical *topoi* (commonplaces or themes). The term *idol*, itself, after all (from the Greek *eidolon*, or *image*), from the beginning ties Bacon's doctrine of the idols to Plato's critique of *mimesis* (imitation), which, Plato argues, proffers mere *eidola* (images) in place of the real. Let us turn now to Bacon's explication of the Idols of the Cave, by which, we have seen, he refers to the idiosyncratic distortions of the mind that arise from education, upbringing, prejudice and proclivity. From the *Novum organum*: "For everyone . . . has a cave or den of his own, which refracts and discolours the light of nature" (4: 54). To dismiss this explanation as a mere *conceit* is to fail to see it rewrites Plato's *allegory of the cave* (in *Republic* 514a–520a), with significant implications for his philosophy.[25] Meanwhile, in *Of the Advancement of Learning*, Bacon presents "three vanities in studies" (3: 282) (vain words, vain matter, and deceit) that run roughly parallel to the four idols. In regard to the first vanity, "when men study words and not matter," Bacon asserts: "It seems to me that Pygmalion's frenzy is a good emblem or portraiture of this vanity: for words are but the images of matter; and . . . to fall in love with them is all one as to fall in love with a picture" (3: 284). Bacon's admirers, traditionally speaking, are resolved not to become Pygmalion, not to fall in love with Bacon's words; it's the *matter* in which they're interested, not the *words*. But, ironically enough, in failing to take these images seriously one acknowledges their seductive power; one turns them back into the very idols against which Bacon had warned us. And so Bacon becomes a victim of the same vanity, the *vanity of words*, which he attacks in his own work.

Bacon's Legacy

Bacon's achievements, then, lie as much in the domain of poetry as philosophy. And the poetry proved potent indeed in the years to come. Bacon seems to have

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[24] In "Bacon and the Rehabilitation of Nature," Willey laments, "If only Bacon's exposure of the Idols had been remembered"; for "the Baconian method hardened into a dogmatism as assertive as scholasticism itself" (Willey, "Bacon and the Rehabilitation of Nature," 44).

[25] The reliance on classical models evident here remains an essential motif in Bacon's thinking; in his work on civil philosophy, for example, Bacon explicitly bases his legal reforms on the foundation provided by the 6th-century Byzantine emperor Justinian's *Corpus iuris civilis* (*Body of Civil Law*).

escaped the fate of other prophets, those (*pace* Matthew 13: 57[26]) who go unrecognized in their own lands. The Royal Society, founded under Charles II in 1660, saw Bacon as one of its tutelary spirits, and sought to realize Bacon's vision of science as an active, cooperative venture. The faith that knowledge leads inevitably to progress, and which is the very essence of the Enlightenment, may be said to be an extension of Bacon's philosophy.

Hence Bacon's dream, depicted in his utopian fantasy *New Atlantis*, of a rational world ruled by scientists (as opposed to the utopia depicted in Plato's *Republic*, which the *New Atlantis* expressly evokes, and which was administered by theoretical philosophers). The *New Atlantis*, Bacon's last major work, in its general lines follows the tradition of early modern utopian narratives, such as Thomas More's *Utopia* (to which Bacon's work alludes), in which fabulous tales of fabricated worlds also serve as an implicit critique of current social and political realities. Bacon's *New Atlantis*, with its fictional account of a journey to the lost island of "Bensalem" (suggesting a new *Jersualem*), would seem to adhere to this general pattern, except that in this case the centerpiece of the work, constituting almost one third of the text, is devoted exclusively to a description of Bensalem's most venerable institution, "Salomon's House" (evocative of Solomon's temple), which resembles nothing so much as a modern university. Salomon's House is an institution "dedicated to the study of the Works and Creatures of God,"[27] the end of which is "the enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible."[28] According to Susan Bruce in her introduction to the *New Atlantis*, readers in Bacon's own time saw in this description of Salomon's House "a blueprint for a new scientific institution"; in the 17th century it was widely viewed "as a model of the Royal Society."[29]

And yet it has to be acknowledged: Bacon's utopian dream of science triumphant remains largely unfulfilled. Today the old faiths are alive and well; dogmas of all kinds have proved surprisingly tenacious in the face of science. More insidiously, our apparently unlimited faith in technology today suggests a new form of idolatry: precisely the kind of heresy against which Bacon warned us in his oracular prose.

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[26] Returning to his own country to spread the word of God, Jesus finds an unresponsive audience; whereupon he declares: "A prophet is not without honour, save in his own country, and in his own house" (Authorized King James Version).

[27] Bacon, *New Atlantis*, in *Three Early Modern Utopias:* Utopia*, *New Atlantis*, and* The Isle of Pines*, ed. Susan Bruce (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 167.

[28] Ibid., 177.

[29] Bruce, "Introduction," xxxi.

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From Hot Irons to fMRI Machines: On Truth and Lies in a Non-Cerebral Sense

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Abstract

Following the lead of other brain researchers using fMRI technology to connect human experiences to neurocircuitry, Dr. Frank Kozel et al. argue that the possibility of detecting deception in brain activity could replace previous methods of lie detection. Through asymmetrical comparison, this article compares fMRI technology with a sixteenth-century "lie detector" found in *The Hot Iron*, a short renaissance carnival drama by Hans Sachs. Through a brief history of various theories of acceptable and unacceptable naming— from Plato to Judith Butler—I show that naming objects implies belonging to a specific cultural group and its authority to accuse. This conclusion implies that any study of lie detection, rather than focus on the accused, should focus on the culture of the accuser.

Keywords: Lie Detection, Neuroscience, fMRI, Brain, Renaissance, Drama, Critical Theory, Asymmetrical Comparison, Hans Sachs

Sıcak Demirlerden fMRI Makinelerine: Beyinsel Olmayan Gerçek ve Yalanlar Üzerine

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Özet

İnsani deneyimleri sinirsel dolaşımla ilişkilendirmek için fMRI teknolojisini kullanan diğer beyin araştırmacıları gibi, Dr. Frank Kozel ve ekibi, aldatmacaları beyin aktivitesinde ortaya çıkartma ihtimalinin şimdiye kadar kullanılagelen yalan tespiti metotlarının yerine geçebileceğini savunuyor. Bu makale, asimetrik bir karşılaştırma yaparak fMRI teknolojisini ve onaltıncı yüzyılda Hans Sachs tarafından yazılmış olan bir Rönesans dönemi karnaval oyunu The Hot Iron'da konu edilen "yalan makinesi"ni yan yana koyuyor. Makalede, Plato'dan Judith Butler'a uzanan uygun ve uygun olmayan isimlendirme teorilerinin kısa tarihinden yola çıkılarak nesneleri isimlendirmenin belirli bir kültürel gruba aidiyeti ve bu grubun itham etme otoritesini ifade ettiği gösteriliyor. Bu sonuca göre, yalan tespiti çalışmaları, itham edilenden ziyade, itham edenin kültürüne odaklanmalı.

Anahtar kelimeler: Yalan Tespiti, Sinirbilimi, fMRI, Beyin, Rönesans, Tiyatro, Eleştirel Teori, Asimetrik Karşılaştırma, Hans Sachs

Results show that functional MRI is a reasonable tool with which to study deception.

> —Frank Kozel et al., *A Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of Deception*, 2004

Companion to Husband
The iron takes away hair and skin.
Years ago, I was not chaste.[1]

> —Hans Sachs, *The Hot Iron*, 1551

Introduction

Following the lead of other brain researchers using fMRI technology to connect human experiences to neurocircuitry, Dr. Frank Kozel et al. argue that the possibility of detecting deception in brain activity could replace previous methods of lie detection.[2] The argument, abbreviated here, proposes that fMRI imaging techniques—which measures changes in blood oxygenation levels in the brain (BOLD)—can detect differences in regional brain activity during periods of telling the truth and periods of what they call "intentionally misleading another."[3] Many subsequent fMRI studies on lie detection followed this study,[4] though I'll focus on Kozel et al.'s definition and detection of deception. Per their findings, deception is a threefold process: 1) knowledge of the truth (what actually occurred), 2) inhibition of that truth (knowing the truth yet repressing it), and 3) stating a false response. As the opening quote shows, Kozel et al. claim (BOLD) fMRI methods—compared to previous attempts to detect deception using the polygraph that only measures peripheral arousal — are a reasonable tool to detect deception.[5] The researchers' argument is based on criticism of the polygraph, which only measures skin surface temperature, moisture, and heart rate.[6] In contrast, Kozel et al. argue that their method

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[1] Translations of German works, unless otherwise noted, are my own.

[2] Frank Kozel, Tamara Pagett, and Mark George, "A Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of Deception," *Behavioral Neuroscience* 118, no. 4 (2004): 852.

[3] Kozel, Pagett, and George, "A Replication Study," 852.

[4] Jiang, W., J. H. Liu, P. Liao, X. Ma, Y. Rong, W. Tang, and W. Wang, "A Functional MRI Study of Deception Among Offenders with Antisocial Personality Disorders," *Neuroscience*, 244 no. 6 (August 2013): 90-98; Ewout H. Meijer, and Bruno Verschuere, "Deception detection based on neuroimaging: Better than the polygraph?" *Journal of Forensic Radiology and Imaging*, 8 (March 2017): 17-21.

[5] Kozel, Pagett, and George, "A Replication Study," 852.

[6] David Lykken, *A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and Abuses of the Lie* Detector (New York: Plenum, 1998), 12.

measures blood oxygen level changes in the brain, or what they call "deception itself."[7]

As fascinating and socially beneficial the ability to detect deception in the brain may be, I propose that this definition of truth and deception may oversimplify the process of recognizing the actuality of events (the narrative of what actually occurred), repressing that narrative, and finally substituting a false response (deception). Though I will not offer a history of all types of lie detection in recorded human history, the introduction of mechanized detection devices in the nineteenth century led to what Melissa Littlefield called a specific definition of lies as "measurable phenomena that manifest themselves in the body's physiology."[8] Following Latour, Daston, and Galison, Littlefield shows how fMRI technology fits in the myth of the "modern world," where technology can allow nature to speak the truth and previous, non-scientific attempts to determine truth from lies lacked "objectivity."[9]

In this scientific world, which prioritizes objectivity through neutral mechanical and technological means of measurement, truth and lies appear as the language of the body. As we will see, this methodology is based on many assumptions, one of which is the need for accusation: the body is accused, and through interrogation under certain conditions, truth and deception appear as predictable results. In this article, I will provide an alternative model for recognizing truth and deception, one that is not based on the accused, but on the accuser.

This alternate model of truth and lie detection, based not on the accused but on the accuser, can be seen in the second quote that comes from a sixteenth century carnival play. Specifically, I will compare a short comedy, *The Hot Iron* from Hans Sachs—which uses a hot iron as a comical means of detecting deception—with fMRI technology. In this drama from 1551, a wife accuses her husband of adultery and requires the husband to "carry a hot iron to prove his innocence or guilt."[10] Through trickery and reversal, the husband convinces the wife to do the same, and she is burned. In the quote above, the wife's companion shudders at the potential pain of the hot iron and decides not to accuse given her own indiscretions.

This seemingly asymmetrical comparison—data from "high tech" with a 450-year-old burlesque stage production—is an intentional attempt to offer a means to question our contemporary definitions of "truth" and "lies." While

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[7]   Kozel, Pagett, and George, "A Replication Study," 852.

[8]   Melissa Littlefield, *The Lying Brain: Lie Detection in Science and Science Fiction* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2011), 2.

[9]   Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, *Objectivity* (New York: Zone, 2007), 3-4.

[10]   Hans Sachs, "Das heyß Eysen" in *Werke*, Vol. 9 (Stuttgart: Spemann, 1875), 85.

paying attention to changing historical, religious, secular, humanist, and technological habits and beliefs, not to mention popular and judicial allegiances, the tension among various loyalties in the dramatic production will hopefully make clear that defining and narrating the actuality of events is not as easy as Kozel's technology claims. Drawing attention to the culture of accusation, rather than the body of the accused, reveals specific invisible assumptions that should be accounted for in any attempt to determine and then detect truth and lies. Focus on the objective determination of "actual events," particularly the power to name, gains a new meaning in this comparative approach.

After a brief history of various theories of naming within cultural discourses—from Plato, Nietzsche, and Judith Butler—I will explore the "hot iron" as a parody of medieval methods of determining truth and deception. Thereafter, I will return to contemporary fMRI techniques with new insights into understanding how we construct a truthful narrative in order to "accuse" within a cultural context. This comparative method problematizes the focus on the body of the accused, whether burned bodies in the Renaissance or brain images in the twenty-first century.

History of Naming and Comparative Method

Using Plato, Nietzsche, and Butler as theoretical guides to explore the construction of truth and lies situates this article in a particular epistemological tradition, yet the decision to focus on a sixteenth-century German play may seem an odd comparison to fMRI Brain images. Histories of lie detection—like Marston's from 1938 and Trovillo's two-volume history from 1939—are plentiful and the need to revisit the body of the accused is superfluous. In order to focus on the culture of accusation, we need a brief history of naming and the authority behind proper and improper speech. Only then will the asymmetrical comparison become clear.

One of the earliest versions of the problem of names appears in Plato's *Cratylus*, where two figures, Cratylus and Hermogenes, debate the status of names. Are names natural or conventional, either recognized as already existing or created through social interaction?[11] Socrates answers their dilemma with irony and equivocation: names are conventional tools, but the proper use of names allows one to access the "essence" of that which the name names. Though conventional, proper use appears through legislation, or philosophers. Truth then becomes authority through law. Deception, more often than not, occurs through ignorance of the proper use of these tools, not in any intentional misuse.

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[11]   Plato, *Cratylus*, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Cambridge: MIT, 2008), unpaginated.

Kozel's definition of objective truth applicable to fMRI machines picks up at least one of these threads, replacing the philosopher with scientist and fMRI machine. The contemporary concept and value of "objectivity" as a product of nineteenth and early twentieth-century social and scientific concerns, however, did not exist in the ancient world.[12] In *Cratylus*, authority of naming is cultural and social, based on a social position and authority of the philosopher. The second part of this truth/lie binary is ignorance: there is no mention of intentional deception. In an absolute sense, all lies are the result of ignorance.

The emphasis on legislation of the Absolute introduces a cultural and social paradox into the naming process: truth is a negotiation, yet once that battle is won, it becomes absolute. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) offers an example of negotiated truth that does away with the need for the absolute. In his well-known essay, *On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense* (1873), Nietzsche claims that truth is a social construct, not a description of reality. For Nietzsche, there is no way to access the "form," "essence," or "thing in itself."[13] Caught between two competing nineteenth century epistemologies—the Hegelian Absolute and newly developing concept of objectivity, Nietzsche proposed that the need for "truth" was both a drive and myth. Truth appeared as a drive to fit into societal norms and myth of uniformly valid designations for things: truths are lies we have forgotten are lies.

Judith Butler's proposal that the appearance of any substance is a "constructed identity" offers a way to negotiate the problem of essence, objectivity, and myth.[14] Though she applies this scheme to a theory of gender formation, we can also use it to recognize true and deceitful statements. Recognizing something as it is (rather than not recognizing it or naming it as something else) requires a process of constructing an appearance within an accepted cultural framework. For Butler, who was influenced by Nietzsche and Foucault, one who names halts power relationships that are already at work within a community. Naming does not situate itself in opposition to reality that exists in platonic categories or Nietzsche's acceptance of lies. For Butler, truth and naming are instances of power.[15]

For Nietzsche and Butler, naming, or calling a thing a thing, constitutes a reality that in another setting could be otherwise. Though they draw attention to

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[12]   Daston and Galison, *Objectivity*, 40.

[13]   Friedrich Nietzsche, "Über Wahrheit Und Lüge Im Außermoralischen Sinn," in *Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe*, eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Munich and New York: De Gruyter, 1980), 873-890.

[14]   Judith Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory," *Theatre Journal* 40, no. 4 (1988): 519.

[15]   Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution," 527.

and criticize the platonic emphasis on legislation and knowledge, organizing a series of events into a narrative is the sustained activity of a group of individuals rather than the action of one isolated agent. In this view of truth as a social construction, deception can then be seen as a variable practice of drawing attention to power relationships within a group rather than an act of opposition to, or repression of, what actually occurred.

If we accept there are a multiplicity of truths (and lies), and in order to provide examples of this truth construction at work, comparison becomes a very important methodological tool. A statement is "true" or "a lie" because of similarity and difference, which is itself a comparison of unlike categories of speech with the material world. Comparison, as a method, allows one to define 1) the point of view from which categories are created and compared, and 2) the *tertia comparationis* of categories to be compared.[16] After this definition of comparison, Deville states that everything in comparative work hinges on the setup and running of the comparator, and since comparison is by definition relative, following this process in two different forms reveals much about the processes of truth formation.

In setting up his dialogue, Plato has Socrates use comparison when he writes that, in different locations, there are different names for the same things.[17] Nietzsche uses comparison when he places various languages side by side.[18] Butler uses comparison when emphasizing the citationality of all speech.[19] Even Kozel et al. uses comparison when setting up the fMRI imaging experiment through selecting subjects, aggregating data, and interpreting results.[20] Comparison, as a method, is not simply an ironic postmodern tool: it can be meaningfully employed to outline, even if incompletely, the contours of the problem of naming, concealing, and the epistemological assumptions by which one names things and controls other "deceptive" names.

A popular sixteenth-century carnival play, though unsuspecting in its representations of truth and deception, offers what Krause calls "asymmetrical" comparison to the negotiation between truth and lies found in modern brain

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[16] Joe Deville, Michael Guggenheim, and Zuzana Hrdlićková, "Introduction: The Practices and Infrastructures of Comparison," in *Practicing Comparison*, eds. Joe Deville, Michael Guggenheim, and Zuzana Hrdlićková (Manchester: Mattering Press, 2016), 30.

[17] Plato, *Cratylus,* unpaginated.

[18] Nietzsche, "Über Wahrheit Und Lüge," 873.

[19] Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution," 527.

[20] Kozel, Pagett, and George, "A Replication Study," 853-854.

imaging.[21] Asymmetrical comparison draws attention to the familiar in the seemingly unfamiliar, so that even in the most rigorous of scientific experiments, difference is arbitrarily created, enshrined, and disseminated. Krauss shows that asymmetrical comparison emphasizes the rearrangement of signs across fields and systems of knowledge.[22] Without such a comparison, the products of the strategic aims of modern research—typically truth and lies, similarity and difference, or data—remain at best under-exploited, at worst intentionally concealed.

By comparing the latest iteration of lie detection through brain imaging with an example from early modern Germany, I am not advocating a return to a previous episteme of analogous yet empty ideas, or a truth sustained by some supernatural *a priori* divinity, platonic form, or universally valid narrative. As I have shown in my recent book, a traditional comparison between knowledge of the brain in the sixteenth and twenty-first centuries would be impossible given the diverse epistemological assumptions and radically different brain objects.[23] By way of Nietzsche and Butler, asymmetrical comparison provides a guide by which to compare constructions of truth and deception that I hope will expose what Foucault calls, "codes of culture—those governing its schemas, values, and the hierarchy of perception, […] and the empirical orders with which [we] will be dealing and within which [we] will be at home."[24] As with any comparative study, exposing the *tertia comparationis* and the running of the comparator are of utmost importance. Here, the *tertium comparationis* is not truth, lies, or the brain; rather, it is the position of accusation within a culture of acceptable lies.

Hot Irons, Deception and Early Modern Allegiance

Hans Sachs, a writer and shoemaker from Nuremberg, Germany, is known in the historical literary canon for his moral poetry and popular carnival plays.[25] Though he is not directly seen as an advocate for detecting truth and lies, I will

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[21] Monika Krause, "Comparative Research: Beyond Linear-Causal Explanation," in *Practicing Comparison*, eds. Joe Deville, Michael Guggenheim, and Zuzana Hrdlićková (Manchester: Mattering Press, 2016), 58.

[22] Krause, "Comparative Research," 59.

[23] Jameson Kismet Bell, *Performing the Sixteenth-Century Brain: Beyond Word and Image Inscriptions* (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2018), 52.

[24] Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Random House, 1970), xx.

[25] Maria E. Müller, *Der Poet der Moralität. Untersuchengen zu Hans Sachs. Europäische Hochschulschriften* (New York: Peter Lang, 1985), 57-63.

use one of his carnival plays, *The Hot Iron*, to uncover what Judith Butler calls a "social fiction […], a sedimentation that over time has produced a set of corporeal styles which, in reified form, appear as the natural configuration of bodies."[26] Butler argues that the construction of discreet genders in binary relations to one another is a social function, not a natural necessity. If one applies this term "sedimentation" to truth formation, like Nietzsche's "forgetting", the sites of repetition of a name become marks or traces of embedded power relations. We can revisit and follow traces of certain "true" and "deceptive" binaries that restrict the multiple possibilities of experience. As we will see in *The Hot Iron*, Hans Sachs uses these binaries to portray acceptable behaviors and therefore correct patterns of seeing truthfully and looking for deception. The negotiation of truth requires allegiance to specific types of truth, not a recognition of the absolute truth.

The Hot Iron is a comical play that revolves around a hot iron used as a detector of true and deceptive speech and practice. Almost as important as the play itself is the time in which it was performed: carnival. Victor Turner, among others, has shown that carnival in Early Modern European contexts, as an iteration of ancient Saturnalia, was a liminal space and time. Summarizing other research, Turner writes that carnival "refers to the period of feasting and revelry just before Lent, including Mardi Gras in France, Fastnacht in Germany and Shrove Tide in England."[27] Sachs wrote the play for a festive time characterized by "unruliness," "disorder," "mockery" and "anything may go"; socially accepted lies—gender and political roles, social positions, and symbols—were reversed, subverted, or revealed as "plastic."[28] It is from this liminal context of the reversal of truth and lies that we can position ourselves to take a brief look at Sachs' *The Hot Iron*.

Three characters—a wife, husband, and wife's friend—use the hot iron to reveal traces of acts done in secret (adultery). As both a judicial tool and a plot device, the hot iron will burn the guilty and spare the innocent. The action begins when the wife accuses the husband of adultery and orders him to carry a hot iron that has been placed inside a chalk ring. If he is burned, he is guilty. If he remains untouched, he is innocent. The husband, afraid of being burned by the hot metal, secretly places a piece of wood in his palm and successfully carries the iron outside the circle. After his "miraculous" acquittal and in a fit of anger combined with a desire for revenge, he orders his wife to prove her faithfulness by carrying the hot iron. After protesting—she asks her friend to

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[26] Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution," 524.

[27] Victor Turner, "Frame, Flow, and Reflection: Ritual and Drama as Public Liminality," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 6, no. 4 (December, 1979): 475.

[28] Turner, "Frame, Flow, and Reflection," 480-484.

carry the iron for her, but is refused because the friend admits to having had many affairs in the past—the wife confesses she had multiple affairs throughout the town. As a punishment, the husband again orders her to carry the iron; she reluctantly does and is burned. In the end, rather than a lie detector, the hot iron becomes a tool of retribution.

The hot iron from the play can be classified as type of Ordeal, calling on a divine power to enter nature and judge in human affairs. This cultural technology had fallen out of practice by the mid-sixteenth century. When Hans Sachs wrote *The Hot Iron* in Nuremberg in 1551, imperial German cities had already established the use of witnesses, jury trials, and other types of procedural proof of a person's guilt or innocence.[29] If one was accused of wrong doing, surviving an Ordeal was no longer necessary to publicly prove one's innocence. In Nuremberg, since the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Inner and Outer Councils decided criminal cases—the precursor of modern trial by peers—depending on the severity of the accusation.[30] The councils consisted of only eligible citizens of the city and its surrounding territories—mayors, patricians and guildsman—who could judge the accusations, the defense, and punishment in order to protect the common life of the city. Ziegler and Holenstein dispute the dates at which oath swearing and Ordeals fell out of fashion: Ziegler argues that Ordeals and oaths disappeared at the onset of the Early Modern Period,[31] while Holenstein shows that swearing oaths and modified forms of the Ordeal existed until well into the eighteenth century.[32] Both Ziegler and Holenstein agree, however, that the form and cultural significance of the Ordeal and the oath changed from the High Middle Ages to the Early Modern Period, roughly the sixteenth century. This shift was the result of religious and secular groups struggling for control of both physical and psychological territories, thus requiring new modes to secure allegiance and detect treachery.

What are the physical and psychological territories in question in *The Hot Iron* and how were true and deceptive statements negotiated? If it follows that one's experience of the world is a specific construction, then the wife accuses

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[29]   Cecil Hedlam, *The Story of Nuremberg* (London: Dent & Co, 1908), 150.

[30]   Harmut Kuntsmann, *Zauberwahn und Hexenprozess in der Reichstadt Nürnberg*, Vol. 1 (Nürnberg: Nürnberger Werkstücke zur Stadt- und Landesgeschichte, 1970), 122.

[31]   Vicki Ziegler, *Trial by Fire and Battle in Medieval German Literature* (New York: Camden, 2004), 6.

[32]   Andre Holenstein, "Seelenheil und Untertanenpflicht. Zur gesellschaflichen Funktion und theoretischen Begründung des Eides in der ständischen Gesellschaft," in *Der Fluch und der Eid: Zeitschrift für historische Forschung*, ed. Peter Blicke (Berlin: Dunker, 1993), 40.

her husband of adultery *not* because she saw him commit the act, but because his behavior did not fit the accepted practice of being a man, regardless of "the truth." She is accusing him of breaking categories of masculinity and spousal duties, as well as projecting her own guilt. As we see in the following lines, the wife saw her husband act *not husband-like* and desired proof of her perception, not his acts:

> The Hot Iron
> (A Carnival Play for 3 People)
>   *The Wife Speaks*
> I've had my husband for four years,
> I liked him a lot more back then.
> My love for him is already snuffed
> Out and my heart is strangled.
> […]
> *The Wife Speaks: (to husband)*
> I recently think you are an adulterer;
> Let it be, that you exonerate yourself,
> This is not an easy accusation.[33]

From these lines, the husband could have been a standout worker, an influential politician, or simply a lazy individual who spent the day drinking beer under the sun. In her accusation, the wife becomes a guardian, or protector of a specific habit of perception and the social order that fostered that type of perception. In addition, as told from a male author, the wife projects her cuckolding practice onto her husband, which was a secret fear of many if not all medieval and early modern households.

Along with domestic affairs, Hans Sachs dramatizes a power struggle between religious and secular authority to define the household by having the wife appeal to the supernatural, the hot iron, through which God would determine truth and deception. In this context, the Prince or duke of an imperial city had the right to require allegiance to the civic codes of social relationships of a particular confession—Protestant, Catholic, Calvinist, etc.—established by his authority.[34] This secular judicial practice set itself in opposition to one's allegiance to an absolute divine order. If one swore an oath to God and to the church, one neglected one's duties to the secular authority, and vice versa. In this power struggle, we can see the change in the meaning of an oath and Ordeal in early modern justice; by swearing an oath, one states that one will

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[33]   Hans Sachs, "Das heyß Eysen," 84.

[34]   Holenstein, "Seelenheil und Untertanenpflicht," 26.

belong to a certain group of people who experience and thus act in a certain way. Controlling this allegiance, this oath, was paramount to both religious and secular leaders and the battle over oath-swearing rituals changed what it meant to experience the world.

The medieval oath was an oath of honor: one swore an oath and through the act of swearing, one became a trustworthy individual.[35] The problems inherent in this ubiquitous use of oath swearing became apparent to late medieval and early modern society. In *The Hot Iron*, the oath of fidelity the husband swore at marriage bound him not only to his wife and God, but to the secular authority and to the community. He, in turn, assumed the oath to be valid and durable. Unless there was a clear deviation from the accepted rules of behavior and perception, the oath was considered valid:

> *The Husband*
> I am secretly hurt by her.
> I never bothered her to ask
> If she kept her honor or not.[36]

Whether an inattentive husband or himself a womanizer, the husband states that only an accusation would lead to a change in the facts. For the husband, a fictional narrative continued as fact until it was compared with another narrative. In these lines, the husband would be running a comparator of symmetry: the newly revealed cheating wife does not conform to his image of the faithful wife, where the category of "wife" links both "honorable" and "dishonorable." In the play, the use of names such as "Wife" and "Husband" are themselves categories, discourses with certain acceptable and unacceptable behaviors. The resulting difference reveals the lies we accept as fiction until we recognize them as lies. At the same time, the "truth" that we believe is based on belonging to certain social group with established fictions and authorities to guard them.

Achim Landwehr, a researcher in early modern police records, describes binary relationships between fact and fiction found in *The Hot Iron* also depicted in court records. For the working-class society (not yet the repressed Marxian proletariat, but the 'handworker' class at the end of feudalism), the household was the strongest and most repeated act of social stability.[37] Through church and judicial records, Landwehr describes the complicated power

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[35]   Ziegler, *Trial by Fire*, 33.

[36]   Hans Sachs, "Das heyß Eysen," 87.

[37]   Achim Landwehr, *Repertorium der Policeyordnungen der Frühen Neuzeit, Bd. 4: Baden und Württemberg* (Vittorio Klostermann: Frankfurt a.M., 2001), 197.

relationships rising from a man (husband) or woman (wife) failing in their household duties. The husband confirms the "proper" image of the household in the following lines:

> *The Husband*
> If she wanted to keep her piety,
> After living such passionate days and nights,
> She should have been honorably quiet.[38]

"Piety" and "honor"—known fictions since they bookend the wife's "passionate days and nights" —can only be kept with wife's silence. Accusation, if anything, reveals the position from which one accuses. The latent economic, religious, political, and social dynamics in the majority of church and court records are just that: latent and invisible. To accuse, to name, is to force something into being. A husband who drinks too much, is physically violent, abstains from church, steals, does not pay taxes, or mismanages money is simply a bad husband. A wife who does not cook enough, reads too many books, complains, allows her in-laws to stay too long, makes her husband a cuckold, or does not care for the children properly is simply a bad wife.[39] If we were to take visible performance of a good 'household' or 'not household-like' as the true narrative, we can easily discuss truth and deception. The hot iron, even if useless as a lie detector, reveals the naming of power relationships that separate into a multiplicity of allegiances of belonging and excluding. Bringing this pattern to our attention hopefully allows for the possibility to recognize things, ideas, and power relationships that we, in contemporary culture, because of our own allegiances to certain modes of power, do not recognize.

As we transition from the Early Modern Period back to contemporary neuroscience, its assumptions and varied allegiances, being open to the possibility of multiple narratives is important to engaging fMRI brain images as lie detectors. If we assume my premise, that constructing truth and deception requires that one belong to a specific group of common believers from which to accuse, then both *The Hot Iron* and fMRI brain images become dependent on the social context and the construction of a specific narrative, rather than the manifestation of a burnt body or blood flow in the brain. We cannot deny that new technology provides a vast amount of information. However, the questions one asks to acquire that data, and the answers received, provide as much information about the cultural narrative of truth and deception as seeing those questions represented in digitized flesh.

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[38] Hans Sachs, "Das heyß Eysen," 93.

[39] Achim Landwehr, *Policey im Alltag. Die Implementation frühneuzeitlicher Policeyordnungen in Leonberg* (Vittorio Klostermann: Frankfurt a.M., 2000), 195.

Brain Images: The Body's Technological Language

If we examine the construction of a modern scientific narrative, and look specifically at Kozel's argument that one can see both 'the truth' and 'deviation from that truth' in brain images, the construction of a truthful narrative and the codes on which the narrative is built, leads to a third option between the mind and brain: in whatever form the brain takes, we are performing it through various cultural positions and the network of values built up around those beliefs.[40]

Given Kozel's original position and our journey through a representation of sixteenth century lie detection, what might the truthful narrative they propose to detect in the brain be? The comparison between the hot iron and the fMRI machine becomes apparent through a quick summary of Kozel's procedures, which reads like a casting call and a script for a theatrical production.

After finding a suitable group of volunteers, the volunteers are taken to a room in which fifty dollars is placed under two of six objects. While in the fMRI machine, the participants are shown various objects that are in the room and asked to click "yes" or "no" when the object appears under which the fifty dollars has been placed. The participants are told they will receive fifty dollars if they answered truthfully. They would receive another fifty dollars if they can deceive a lab technician who did not know where the money is placed (in fact, all participants will receive the extra fifty dollars). The results of the subjects' truthful or deceptive responses were compared with the actual location of the money.[41] The fMRI scanner could detect blood flow in brain regions in truthful and deceptive responses. Since, per their assumptions, the truthful response is encoded in the deceptive response, one can assume that areas of the brain active during truthful responses subtracted from areas active during deception will give a region of the brain active during deception.[42]

On the surface, this appears to be a simple arithmetical problem. The researchers have removed all variables to provide the optimum chance to visualize the brain both recognizing the true events (six objects under which there are two other objects) and then repressing that knowledge and giving an intentionally deceptive response. However, if one is to investigate the codes on which this narrative is constructed, to look away from the brain image by which truth and deception are represented, the technological imperative becomes less transparent and more of a road block, that which, like the early modern hot

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[40]   Jameson Kismet Bell, "The Performativity of a Historical Brain Event: Revisiting 1517 Strassburg," in *The Neuroscientific Turn in the Humanities*. Ed. Melissa Littlefield and Jenell Johnson (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012), 65-66.

[41]   Kozel, Pagett, and George, "A Replication Study," 853.

[42]   Kozel, Pagett, and George, "A Replication Study," 853-55.

iron, stares at viewer in an authoritative manner. The experiment itself also becomes more carnivalesque than the researchers would want readers to find.

Clearly, it would be unwise to doubt that there is activity in the brain during language production. Part of the authority of the fMRI is that it can detect that which human senses cannot. In contrast to other technological forms of lie detection—the polygraph—Kozel et al. argues that, because the data collected is data about the brain and the polygraph only detects a body's peripheral response, it can directly detect deception. However, fMRI imaging detects changes in blood oxygenation levels, or movement of oxygen from areas of low to higher density through metabolic processes. That blood levels equate to truth and lies is a type of constructed seeing rather than a recognition of the truth. In naming this act, namely that blood moves during thought, one can see the power struggles between various types social, technical, legal, and epistemological practices.

W. Marston, one of the early proponents of using the polygraph to discover truth through deception, wrote the goal concisely in 1938: "It is necessary to test for some emotion which will not be present unless the person is lying…. Some one bit of behavior which would always mean a person is lying."[43] The fMRI machine is supposed to be the most advanced iteration of this biological maxim: it offers truth through its transparency because it merely collects data about the body. The researcher, as with the polygraph, only needs to compare a brain telling the truth with a lying brain. The difference between the two should then be irrefutable. Yet by using an fMRI machine, just as one uses language, one automatically limits both the questions asked and the answers the body offers to the authority of certain power structures.

If we return to Judith Butler's interpretation of speech acts, this correspondence between language and the material world breaks down in use. In stating something, one cites that which has already been said, arresting power dynamics in the moment of stating.[44] Objectivity, the goal of contemporary science since the mid-nineteenth century, is the slow process of carving away that which can be said by citing only the data and the procedures of its production. In the creation of objective data, there is a historical force behind the data that both subsumes the subject in its historicity and creates the subject as belonging to the group of users of that data. In Kozel et al.'s study, one can see a community of believers form and the development of a language of belonging within diverse and competing power structures. The power of fMRI, as with the hot iron, does not allow one to accuse, it compels in order to belong.

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[43] W. M. Marston, *The Lie Detector Test* (New York: Smith, 1938), 32.

[44] Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performance* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 50.

Truth, or the accepted fiction, has already been negotiated prior to the machine's use and the recognition of "deception" allows one to belong to a particular epistemic group in the following manner of running the comparator. First, the subjects are all (paid) volunteers. In a sense, they have already ascribed to the authority of the machine. Second, those not qualified to participate in the study are excluded: subjects who have certain physiological traits that would limit the machine's accuracy in uniform data collection are omitted. Pregnancy, medication, history of psychiatric disorders, younger than eighteen, older than forty, substance abuse/dependence, illiteracy, closterphobia, medical implants, criminality, or recent caffeine and nicotine use were all reasons for exclusion.[45] Third, certain individuals are excluded after the testing procedure because they did not follow protocol.

In addition to the above-mentioned construction techniques and selection procedures, the actual brain used for the image in the publication was not of any of the patients. In order to remove variation in individual brains shapes, it is standard practice in fMRI image presentation to use a brain image generated from a software program.[46] The image used in the article replaced the variations that occur in brains of actual people in favor of a more aesthetically pleasing, symmetrical and easily manipulated representation of a virtual brain. A compilation of data from the 10 participants was then superimposed on the artificial brain to provide a visual correlation to deception (red and yellow indicate areas used for deception).

Depending on how one interprets the process of data collection versus the presentation of data collected, the authors have presented deception itself. However, like in carnival, the exclusion of socially unacceptable lies, the purposeful misleading of another, [that which] is ubiquitous in society and in medicine— was suspended for the duration of the experiment. The terms change as well: images are "smoothed" "reoriented" and "adjusted"; subjects were "excluded" "limited" "screened" and therefore "statistically significant."[47] Within the liminal space of the experiment, Turner's "anything may go" holds firm and accepted lies of culture were suspended for the more useful lies of the experiment. Adina Roskis confirms the carnival nature of such experiments when she separates the "experimental" from the "external" contexts,

> While such measures are relatively effective at distinguishing these [truth and deception] in the experimental contexts in which they are developed, there are deep problems with external and ecological

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[45] Kozel, Pagett, and George, "A Replication Study," 853-855.

[46] Kozel, Pagett, and George, "A Replication Study," 854.

[47] Kozel, Pagett, and George, "A Replication Study," 852-856.

> validity, and little insight into content-related aspects that could elevate them into true mindreading experiments."[48]

By limiting exactly who belongs to this group and how they must respond to be a part of the group—what one might call a biological oath swearing—Kozel created a language of belonging that did not exclude lying from the true narrative. In fact, the authors have actually included lying as a central part of the discursive practice of those who belong to the group. A closer look at their procedures may shed more light on the meaning of truth and lies and the construction of the culture of accusation, rather than a judgment of objectivity.

The Construction of Truth from Lies

Proposing to offer a valid alternative to the easily duped polygraph test, Kozel opens the article in *Behavioral Neuroscience* with the following statement that justifies the use of fMRI technology in lie detection,

> Understanding the neurocircuitry involved in deception could have a profoundly beneficial impact on society. Deception, defined as the purposeful misleading of another, is ubiquitous in society and in medicine. Understanding the brain basis of deception could lead to both a method in which deception is accurately detected and to a better understanding of disorders in which deception is a prominent component (e.g., antisocial personality disorders).[49]

Placing the social benefits of a more rigorous lie detector to the side for a moment, if one explores the techniques of data collection and turns away from the surface image, data from fMRI testing performs essentially the same function as polygraphs (contrary to the authors' statement or belief), and the hot iron. Each of these tools registers biological variations that are believed to occur when an individual is telling either a true statement or a deceptive statement.[50] Kulynych shows the legal status of such a lie detector remains unclear. Her comparison of an fMRI machine to a "crystal ball" invokes medieval methods where the common element is the faults in the technology and the prejudicial factors that far outweigh the probative value.[51] What's more,

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[48] Adina Roskis, "Mindreading and Privacy," in *The Cognitive Neurosciences V*, eds. Michael Gazzaniga and George Mangun (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014), 1008.

[49] Kozel, Pagett, and George, "A Replication Study," 852.

[50] Jennifer Kulynych, "Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal Ball?" *Stanford Law Review* 49, no. 5 (1997): 1254.

[51] Kulynych, "Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence," 1262.

companies who are selling fMRI technology as lie detectors are mainly in the business of determining guilt or innocence in cases of fraud and divorce.[52]

Conclusions

Through asymmetrical comparison—lie detection through fMRI image with a hot iron from the sixteenth century—we have brought the invisibility of the following cultural assumptions to the foreground: the *tertium comparationis* of the position of the accuser and the acceptance of lies a particular culture. The unspoken value of contemporary bio-tech research demonstrates the mythical character of the modern age: machines are authoritative, statistics equate to truth, and deception can be written on individual bodies. From within this domain, one is allowed to accuse, and one is allowed to name.

Those without the authority behind the machine—jurors, judges, and everyone but researchers with million dollar grants—have a similar option as the audience 450 years ago watching Hans Sachs' play, *The Hot Iron*: either wait to be accused or take part in the social construction of truth and deception. If those outside of the bio-tech sectors do not participate in this negotiation process, the Phillips Intera 3.0T Imaging Machine (or its international competitors) has the potential to become what the *judicum dei* did in Medieval times: provide a single source of power for defining social relationships. Thankfully, a recent collection of scholars across the humanities and sciences are negotiating the legal, epistemological, social, and cultural aspects of the brain research.[53]

All the same, as with the renaissance and the twenty-first century, at least there will be an eclectic dialogue around the construction of what it means to be truthful or deceitful, even if that means we first also see ourselves and our technologies as accusers. To modify Nietzsche maxim, *to accuse* is the first step in the creation of truth, which is also the first step in belonging to a group of tolerable deceivers. Only then might we be able recognize the authorities by which we are allowed to accuse. Kozel et al.'s motivational statement offers insight into the paradox of truth and deception: "Deception is ubiquitous in society and medicine."[54] What matters is not that we lie, but which lies we turn into the truth. In a few years, hopefully we can speak as Hans Sachs' wrote in a typical end to one of his dramas

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[52] Margaret Talbot, "Duped: "Can Brain Scans Uncover Lies?" *The New Yorker*, July 2 2007.

[53] Melissa Littlefield and Jenell Johnson, eds, *The Neuroscientific Turn in the Humanities*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012): 1-28.

[54] Kozel, Pagett, and George, "A Replication Study," 852.

Hans Sachs wishes that no more
filth to be proven through the hot iron.[55]

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[55]　Sachs, "Das heyß Eysen," 97.

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William Shakespeare'in *Fırtına*'sındaki Ötekilik[1]

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Özet

Her ne kadar sayıca çok fazla olmasa da, Shakespeare'in ötekiliği temsil eden Caliban, Shylock, Othello, Cleopatra gibi karakterleri Shakespeare'in en popüler trajedi kahramanları olan Hamlet, Macbeth, Kral Lear kadar etkileyicidir ve sayısız çağdaş esere ilham kaynağı olmaya devam etmektedir. Bu makale, Shakespeare'in son oyunu olan *Fırtına*'daki Caliban karakterine odaklanarak bu karakterin ötekiliğinin hem o dönem koşullarında hem de günümüz koşullarında ne ifade ettiğini inceleyecektir. Caliban'ın farklı edebi dönemlerde değişen (ve bazen birbiriyle çelişen) temsillerini inceleyerek bu karakterin özellikle Latin Amerika bağlamında önem kazanan mücadeleci kimliği tartışılacaktır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Shakespeare, *Fırtına*, Caliban, ötekilik

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[1] Bu makalenin biraz farklı bir versiyonu *Aşiyan* dergisinin 2014 yılı Ekim ayında çıkan Shakespeare özel sayısında yayımlanmıştır. http://asiyandergisi.com/

Otherness in William Shakespeare's *The Tempest*

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Abstract

Shakespeare's characters who represent "otherness" such as Caliban, Shylock, Othello, Cleopatra, which are as memorable as his popular tragedy heroes such as Hamlet, Macbeth, and King Lear, continue to inspire numerous contemporary works. This article focuses on Caliban who appears in Shakespeare's last play The Tempest, and discusses the significance of Caliban's otherness both within the context of the sixteenth century and the present. Tracing Caliban's changing (and sometimes conflicting) reception in a number of literary milieus, the article ultimately focuses on Caliban's gradual association with subaltern groups and movements particularly for Latin American cultures.

Keywords: Shakespeare, The Tempest, Caliban, otherness

Shakespeare'i Shakespeare yapan en önemli özelliklerinden biri "ötekiliği" ya da "yabancı" olanı bütün gerçekliği ve karmaşası ile tanımlayabilmesidir. "Öteki" olan hem bizden farklı olan, hem de bizim içimizde olup da bastırmaya çalıştığımız "diğer" yanımızdır. Shakespeare bizi kendimizle baş başa bırakmaya, yüzleşmeye zorlayan ve bunu başaran yegâne yazarlardan biri olarak güncelliğini korur. Bu makale, Shakespeare'in son oyunu olan *Fırtına*'daki Caliban karakterine odaklanarak bu karakterin ötekiliğinin hem o dönem koşullarında hem de günümüz koşullarında ne ifade ettiğini inceleyecektir. 1611 yılında yazılmış ve aynı yıl Kral I. James'in sarayında oynanmış olan *Fırtına* oyunu, Shakespeare'in memleketi Stratford-upon-Avon'a çekilip beş sene sonra ölmesinden önce yazdığı son oyundur. Shakespeare'in bütün oyunları ölümünden sonra 1623 yılında "First Folio" olarak basılmıştır ve elimizdeki metin işte bu Folio'da basılmış olan metindir. Oyun, ıssız bir adanın açıklarında yaşanan bir fırtına ile başlar. Bu felaket sonunda fırtınadan sağ çıkan gemi yolcularıyla mürettebatı ve adada yaşayanlar bir araya gelecektir. Ada, yeni gelenler için zaman zaman tuhaf seslerin ve esrarlı bir müziğin duyulduğu egzotik bir yerdir. Oyunun ikinci sahnesinde, adada yaşayan ve fırtınayı çıkaran büyücü Prospero, kızı Miranda'ya on iki yıl önce bu adaya nasıl sürüldüklerini şu şekilde anlatır: Aslında Milano Dükü olan Prospero, kardeşi Antonio ile Napoli Kralı Alonso'nun işbirliği sonucu Milano'dan sürülür. Antonio, Prospero'nun dükalığını gasp edip, Prospero ve kızı Miranda'yı küçük bir tekne ile denizin açıklarına terk eder. Prospero ve kızı şu an yaşadıkları ismi verilmeyen bir Akdeniz adasına çıkarlar. Sürgün edildikleri sırada henüz üç yaşında olan Miranda geçmişinden çok az şey hatırlamaktadır.

Oyunda geçen diyaloglar ve olaylar bir araya getirildiğinde Prospero'nun anlattığı hikâyeyi şu şekilde tamamlamak mümkündür: Her ne kadar Prospero, biraz da büyücülük gücünden ve "bilgin" kişiliğinden aldığı destekle adanın hâkimi gibi davransa da, Miranda'yla adaya ilk geldiklerinde ada aslında sahipsiz değildir. Onlardan önce adaya Cezayir'den büyücülük yaptığı gerekçesiyle sürülen (hamile olduğu için hayatı bağışlanmıştır) ve daha sonra ölen Sycorax'ın adada doğurduğu Caliban adlı "köle" yaşamaktadır. Aslında son derece özgür olan Caliban, Prospero adaya yerleştikten sonra onun kölesi olmak zorunda kalmıştır. Büyü gücünü kullanan Prospero, eğer emirlerini yerine getirmezse dayanılmaz sancılar çektirmek, üstüne kirpiler salmak, etrafını maymunlar ve yılanlarla sarmak gibi türlü işkencelerle Caliban'ı tehdit eder. Prospero ve diğer karakterler, Caliban'ın şehvet düşkünü, kötü kokulu, tembel, hain, sarhoş, asi ve şeytana tapıcı[2] olduğunu söyleyerek oyun boyunca aşağılar. Caliban'ın oyun içindeki genel imajı oldukça olumsuzdur.

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[2] Stephen Greenblatt, *Learning to Curse: Essays in Early Modern Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 26.

Adada ayrıca, içlerinde oyunun ana karakterlerinden biri olan Ariel'in de bulunduğu, pekçok cin ve peri yaşamaktadır. Bunlardan en önemlisi Ariel'dir. Prospero adaya geldiğinde Ariel'i Sycorax tarafından bir ağaç kavuğunda hapsedilmiş olarak bulmuştur. Sycorax çoktan ölmüş olduğu için Ariel'i kurtarmak Prospero'ya düşer, ama bu yardımı karşılığında birtakım doğaüstü güçlerine sahip Ariel'i de kendine esir eder. Kısacası, Prospero "efendi"dir ama bu efendiliği ancak yardımcıları sayesinde yürütebilir: Bir yandan Caliban odun taşımak, ateş yakmak gibi "dünyevi" işlerini yaparken, öte yandan Ariel de "ulviliği" temsil eder ve efendisinin büyülerini uygulamasında yardımcı olur. Aslında adanın tek bir yerlisi vardır; o da ada üzerinde en az hak iddia eden karakter olan Ariel'dir. Adada doğan Caliban dışındaki diğer karakterlerin hepsi sonradan adaya gelip ada ve adadakiler üzerine hâkimiyet kurmaya çalışmaktadırlar –bu yönüyle oyun tam bir sömürgecilik eleştirisidir. Oyunda farklı sosyal sınıflardan olan Avrupalı karakterler "medeni" bir toplumdan gelmelerine rağmen, Caliban'dan çok daha ilkesiz ve ahlaksız davranacaktır. Yine de Shakespeare, Gonzalo gibi iyiliksever bir karakter ekleyerek oyundaki Avrupalıları kategorize etmekten kaçınmıştır. Prospero'nun fırtınayı çıkarmasının sebebi kendisinden dükalığını zorla alan kardeşi Antonio ve işbirlikçisi Napoli Kralı Alonso'dan intikam almaktır. Nitekim fırtınaya yakalanan gemide yolculuk etmekte olanlar, aralarında Antonio ve Alonso'nun da bulunduğu Napoli ve Milano'nun ileri gelen soylularından başkası değildir. Shakespeare'in çoğu yozlaşmış ve birbirine ihanet eden soylu karakterleri göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, oyunun sömürgeciliğin olduğu kadar aristokrat sınıfın da sıkı bir eleştirisi olduğu söylenebilir.

Prospero'nun yaptığı plana göre Alonso'nun oğlu Ferdinand, kızı Miranda'ya âşık olup O'nunla evlenecek ve bu sayede Miranda önemli bir toplumsal konum elde edecektir. Miranda'nın kendisinin de safça belirttiği gibi, babası ve Caliban'dan sonra gördüğü tek insan formundaki varlık Ferdinand'dır. Oyunda iyi niyetli, neredeyse bir melek figürü olarak resmedilen Miranda Ferdinand'a ilk bakışta (belki de yine babasının büyüsü sayesinde) âşık olur –bu oyunun mutlu sonla bitmesine sebep olacaktır. Fakat mutlu sona gelmeden önce, adaya çıkar çıkmaz fırtına kazazedelerinin başlarından pekçok komik olay geçer. Prospero, Ariel'in yardımıyla Kral ve adamlarına türlü türlü oyunlar oynar, onları adeta parmağında oynatır. Bu arada diğer kazazedelerden ayrı düşen Alonso'nun kâhyası Stephano ile soytarısı Trinculo, Caliban ile karşılaşırlar. İçkiye çok düşkün olan bu iki soytarı-kahraman, Caliban'ı da içkiyle tanıştırınca Caliban bu "kutsal" sıvıya sahip iki kahramanı ilahlaştırır. Oyunun bu bölümü Avrupalıların Amerika yerlileri ile ilk karşılaşmalarını adeta parodileştirir. Bu gülünç üçlü işbirliği yaparak Prospero'yu yerinden etmeye çalışırlar, ama planları gerçekleşmeyecektir.

Oyunun son perdesinde Prospero tüm düşmanlarını bağışlar, Ariel'i serbest bırakır, adaya, büyücülüğe ve kitaplarına veda ederek oyun boyunca bahsi

geçen Milano'ya doğru yola çıkar. Prospero'nun "sanatım" diye söz ettiği büyücülüğe vedasını, *Fırtına* son oyunu olduğu için Shakespeare'in sahneye vedası olarak yorumlamak yaygın bir yaklaşımdır. Oyunun sonunda karakterlerin hepsinin nereye gideceği ve ileride ne yapacağı belliyken ve Prospero herkesi affetmişken bir tek Caliban mutluluk çemberinin dışında kalır. Herkes adayı terk ederken o geride yalnız başına bırakılır: Caliban'ın bu durumdan memnun olup olmadığına dair bir ipucu yoktur. Eğer oyun düzenin sağlanması ile bitiyorsa (ve bu düzen münasip bir evlilik yapmak ve krallığın gerçek sahibine iade edilmesi gibi toplumsal hayatı düzenleyen olaylarla vurgulanıyorsa) Caliban bu düzene karşıt olmasa da bu düzenin dışında, konuyla alakasız bırakılmıştır, yani neredeyse oyunun dışına tekmelenmiştir. Caliban, makalenin devamında değinilecek olan muğlaklığını oyunun sonunda bile korur.

Oyuncu kadrosunda üç ana karakter ön plana çıkar: Prospero, Caliban ve Ariel karakterlerinin her üçü de "insan"dan farklı ya da öte bir yerlerde konumlanır. Prospero'nun yarı insan yarı büyücülüğü, Caliban'ın yarı insan yarı "hayvanlığı," Ariel'in insan gibi davranan ama havadan oluşan cisimsizliği[3] düşünüldüğünde, Shakespeare'in adeta insan olmanın sınırlarını incelediği söylenebilir. Oyunun genelinde Caliban karakteri diğer karakterlerin "ötekisi" olma görevi görür. Farklı farklı açılardan Prospero, Ariel, Ferdinand, Miranda, Stephano/Trinculo ile oyun boyunca karşıtlık yaratma görevi olan bir karakterdir Caliban. Caliban, Ariel veya Ferdinand ile aynı sahnede yer almaz, hatta belki bu iki karakterin varlığından haberdar değildir. Yine de kavramsal olarak onlara karşıtlık oluşturmak için oyundaki önemi vazgeçilmezdir. Oyundaki en bariz zıtlık olan dünyevi Caliban-ulvi Ariel karşıtlığı eski Ortaçağ geleneğinde sıkça rastlanan iyi-kötü karşıtlığını temsil eder. Ancak Shakespeare'in yorumlamasıyla bu karşıtlık kesin çizgilerden kurtulmuş, ne Caliban tam tamına kötülüğü, ne de Ariel tam tamına iyiliği temsil edebilir hale dönüşmüştür.[4] Ama Caliban ile Ariel arasında ortak yanlar da çoktur. İkisi de Prospero gelmeden önce adadadır. İkisi de köledir, ikisi de Prospero'dan çekinir.[5] Ayrıca Caliban'ın "ilkelliği" ile narin, soylu ve eğitimli bir karakter olan Ferdinand da karşıtlık oluşturur. Ama tıpkı Ferdinand gibi adanın müziği Caliban'ı da cezbeder, O da Miranda'ya âşıktır. Ferdinand'dan farklı olarak

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[3]   Alden T. Vaughan ve Virginia Mason Vaughan, *Shakespeare's Caliban: A Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991), 9.

[4]   Benzer bir durum Shakespeare'in çağdaşı Christopher Marlowe'un Ortaçağ'ın ahlak dersi veren oyunlarını (*morality play*) yeniden yorumladığı *Dr. Faustus*'taki iyi-kötü melek, Dr. Faustus-Mephistopheles kutuplaşmasındaki muğlaklıkta da görülür.

[5]   Alden T. Vaughan ve Virginia Mason Vaughan. *Shakespeare's Caliban: A Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991), 16-17.

arzularını kontrol edememiştir; Miranda'ya tecavüz etmeye kalkışmıştır.[6] Caliban'ın "ilkelliği" son olarak Miranda'nın saflığı, iyi niyeti ile tezat oluşturur, ama her iki karakter de Prospero'nun öğrencisidir, "fırtına"ya kadar birbirlerinden ve ebeveynlerinden başka insanla karşılaşmamışlardır.

Bu karşıtlıklarda çarpıcı olan nokta Caliban'ın tüm yabancılığı ve ötekiliğine rağmen, karşıtlık oluşturduğu karakterlerle aynı zamanda benzerlikler göstermesidir. Yani öteki olanda her zaman "biz"den de bir şeyler vardır. Ve hatta öteki olan sayesinde "biz"i daha iyi değerlendirme fırsatı elde ederiz. Örneğin, Caliban'ın "vahşiliği" olmasa Prospero iyilik dolu bir yardımsever olarak oyunda yer alacaktır. Oysaki Caliban'ın "vahşiliği"nin çok daha fazlası Prospero'da vardır –bu gerçeği iki vahşilik karşı karşıya geldiğinde ve çatıştığında daha net görürüz. Caliban "ilkel" bir vahşi olmanın ötesine gidemezken (ama nedense bu vahşilik hep daha göze batıcı olmuştur) Prospero "gelişmiş" dünyayı temsil edecek şekilde ileri teknoloji ve orantısız güç kullanır.

Caliban her ne kadar yirminci yüzyıl eleştiri geleneğinde sempatik bir karakter olarak okunsa da, Shakespeare'in döneminde muhtemelen iyi-kötü zıtlığının ikinci kısmını temsil ediyordu: Miranda'ya tecavüz etmeye kalkışan, oyunun çeşitli yerlerinde türlü kötülük düşünen, ama Shakespeare Ortaçağ geleneğini tıpatıp yansıtmadığı ve iyi-kötü ayrışımına bir muğlaklık getirdiği için seyircide az da olsa sempati uyandıran bir karakterdi. Shakespeare'in niyetini kesin olarak bilmek mümkün olmasa da Shakespeare uzmanlarının Caliban karakterinin kaynağını bulmak için yaptıkları aşağıda özetlenen araştırmalar Shakespeare'in neyi amaçladığı konusunda fikir yürütmek açısından faydalı olabilir.

Fırtına'nın ana kaynağı olarak 1609 yılında meydana gelen "Bermuda Olayı" gösterilir. İngiltere'den Virginia kolonisine gitmekte olan "Sea Adventure" adlı gemi Bermuda açıklarında batar, mucize eseri mürettebat kurtulur, adaya çıkar. Adada yaptıkları gemilerle Virginia'ya giderler. Daha sonra kazazedelerin bir kısmı İngiltere'ye dönecektir ve bu maceralar Stratchey'nin *True Reportory* adlı gezi notlarında yayımlanır. Bu kaynak dışında Shakespeare'in *Fırtına*'yı yazarken kullanmış olabileceği sayısız kaynak arasında Ovid'in *Dönüşümler*'i, Montaigne'in "Yamyamlar Üzerine" adlı denemesi, İngiltere'nin Virginia'da yeni yeni kurulmaya başlayan kolonisine yapılan yolculuklar ile ilgili gezginlerin yazdıkları seyahat notları, Kolomb ve Vespucci'nin mektupları, Yeni Dünya'ya gidip gelen maceracı denizcilerin Londra'ya dönüşlerinde barlarda anlattıkları (Shakespeare'in bu barlara gittiği doğru ise) ve hatta Yeni Dünya'dan zorla getirilip para karşılığı "sergilenen" Kızılderililer ile ilgili Shakespeare'in kendi gözlemleri bile

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[6]   Ibid., 17.

sayılabilir.[7] Shakespeare'in pek çok oyununda olduğu gibi burada da ilham aldığı belirli kaynaklardan yola çıkarak kendi yorumunu getirdiğini söyleyebiliriz. Rönesans döneminde orijinalliğin henüz çok önemsenmemesine, tam tersi antik Yunan ve Roma eserlerinin baş tacı edildiği ve bu klasik kaynakların üslup ve içerik olarak taklit edilmesinin iyi yazarlık olarak görüldüğü hümanist eğitimin yaygın olmasına rağmen Shakespeare'in sergilediği orijinallik, Shakespeare'i Shakespeare yapan noktalardan yalnızca biridir.

Oyunun ilk başındaki oyuncu kadrosunda Caliban "köle, vahşi ve çarpık bir yaratık" (First Folio'da "a salvage and deformed slave") olarak tarif edilir. Caliban'ın ait olduğu kültür ve coğrafyaya yönelik kesin bir açıklama yoktur. Oyunda annesinin Cezayirli bir büyücü olduğundan bahsedilir. Babasının ise kim olduğu belli değildir, bir kızgınlık anında Prospero "şeytanın" oğlu olduğunu belirtse de, bunun oyun içinde çok vurgulanmaması Shakespeare'in bu ifadeyi Caliban'ın ötekiliğinin, özellikle de "ahlaksızlığının" altını çizmek için seçtiğini düşündürtür. Caliban karakterinin kökenini Kızılderili veya Afrikalı olarak gösteren sayısız kaynak vardır ve bu iki yorum da aynı derecede mümkündür. Bazı eleştirmenler Caliban isminin etimolojisini inceleyerek karakterin kökenini bulmaya çalışmıştır. Kimilerine göre çingenece "karalık" anlamına gelen "Koliban" kelimesinden üretilmiştir. Daha yaygın bir okuma, Caliban'ın "cannibal" kelimesinin harflerinin yerleri değiştirilerek elde edilmiş bir kelime olduğudur. Coğrafi Keşifler Dönemi'nde "cannibal" kelimesi ile "caribbean" kelimesi aynı anlamı taşıyacak şekilde kullanılıyordu: 15 Şubat 1493 tarihli bir mektupta Kristof Kolomb, Karayiplerde yaşayan yerlilerin yamyam olduğunu iddia eder. Bu durumda Shakespeare'in amacının karakterinin yamyamlığını, dolayısıyla olabilecek en aşağılık insan grubuna dâhil oluşunu vurgulamak değil, ya da sadece bu değil (ki oyunda Caliban'ın yamyam olduğuna dair bir gösterge yoktur), Yeni Dünya'yla bağlantısını sağlamak olduğu düşünülebilir. Shakespeare'in karakteri yamyam değildir, ama "soylu vahşi" de değildir: asi, tembel, içkiye zaafı olan bir karakter olarak Avrupalıların gözünde klişeleşmiş Kızılderili'yi yansıtır.[8]

Tıpkı Othello karakterinde olduğu gibi Caliban'ın da kökenleri oyunda muğlak bırakılmıştır. Kısacası Caliban'ın vahşiliği etnik/coğrafi bir gösterge olmaktan çok kimliği yüzünden ötekileştirilmiş her topluluğu veya hiçbir

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[7] Shakespeare'in edebi kaynaklarına ek olarak pekçok tarihsel olay da oyuna kaynak olarak gösterilir: Oyunda Napoli ve Milan'ın birleşmesini tam da o dönemde İskoçya ve İngiltere'nin birleşmesinin sembolü olarak gören veya oyunda geçen ihanet, gizli tertip temalarını 1605'te yaşanan Barut Komplosu'na (Gunpowder Plot) bağlayan yorumlar bulunmaktadır. Vaughan, Alden T. ve Virginia Mason Vaughan. *Shakespeare's Caliban: A Cultural History.* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991), 6.

[8] Ibid., 48.

topluluğu içinde barındır(may)arak sosyal bir konumu tarif eder. Zaten Caliban'ı tanımlayan "vahşi" (savage) kavramı Rönesans döneminde tam anlamıyla bir yadsıma olarak görülür: "Vahşi"nin anlamı, medeni olmayan, eğitimli olmayan ile paraleldir, dolayısıyla "münasip" bir dini, yazılı dili, yerleşmiş toplumu ve kanunları, "kabul görmüş" alışkanlıkları (örneğin sofra adabı) olmayan, kısacası "ilerleme"ye katkıda bulunmayan "modern İngiliz" toplumunun dışında kalanlar bu gruba dahildir.[9] Hatta İngiltere'nin kendi içindeki ötekileri de bu "vahşi" tanımına girebilir: Yersiz yurtsuzlar, çingeneler, dilenciler.[10] İngiliz popüler kültüründe günümüzde bile içki düşkünü, kavgacı, asi, kötü niyetli, kaba, fazla duygusal, geveze, ağzı bozuk olarak klişeleştirilen İngiltere'nin "arka bahçe"sindeki İrlandalılar da bu gruba girer. On altıncı yüzyılda yeni yeni şekillenmeye başlayan İngiliz milliyetçiliği ötekileştirme süreci ile güçlenir. Eleştirmen Walter Cohen'ın da belirttiği gibi, belki de kasıtsız bir şekilde *Fırtına* oyunu, İngiliz milliyetçiliğinin ırkçı ve emperyalist temellere dayandığını ortaya çıkarır.[11]

Aslında "vahşi adam" (wild man) figürü edebiyatta çok sık karşılaşılan prototipik bir karakterdir ve Caliban bu geleneğin bir uzantısı olarak görülebilir. Örneğin *Odysseia* destanındaki vahşi adam karakteri olan yamyam dev Polyphemus de medeni toplumdan uzak bir mağarada yaşar ve Yunan şehir devletine karşı barbarlığı temsil eder.[12] Ortaçağ ve Rönesans boyunca özellikle karnaval zamanında düzenlenen sembolik geçit törenlerinde "vahşi adam" figürü temsili bir görev görüyordu: Bir yandan her anlamda düzensizliği, kontrolsüzlüğü simgelerken (ve bu yönüyle toplumun libidosunun ortaya çıkmasına geçici olarak imkân verirdi) vahşi adamın gösterinin sonunda hükümdara boyun eğmesi ile düzen geri gelmiş oluyordu. Ortaçağ ve Antik Yunan döneminde edebiyattaki vahşi karakterlere biçilen kötü, ahlaksız, hayvansı, yabani olma gibi özellikler, modern dünyaya bir geçiş dönemi olan Rönesans'ta "gelişmemiş"liğe tekabül etmeye başlar, ama vahşilik kavramı yukarıdaki eski anlamlarından da henüz tam anlamıyla kurtulamamıştır.

Coğrafi Keşifler Dönemi'nde İngiltere dışına yolculuk eden gezginlerin uzak ülkelerde yaşayan "tuhaf yaratıklar"dan bahsetmesi hem bu "canavarların" kendisini hem de canavarlara duyulan ilgiyi artırmış, ortaya Caliban benzeri türlü hayali karakter çıkmıştır. Caliban bu hayali canavarlardan biri midir? Caliban'ın fiziksel özellikleri muğlaktır, hatta fiziksel tanımı neredeyse yok gibidir. Caliban'ın bir insan formu taşıdığını efendisi Prospero bile onaylar: Adaya ilk geldiklerinde Caliban'la karşılaşmalarını anlatırken "O zamanlar bu

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[9]   Ibid., 8-9.

[10] Ibid., 8-9.

[11] Ibid., 50.

[12] Ibid., 58.

adada kadının yavrulayıp burada bıraktığı, benekli köpek eniğine benzer, cadıdan doğma oğlan dışında, insan biçimiyle onurlanmış yaratık yoktu" der.[13] Prospero'nun bu sözlerine rağmen oyun boyunca pekçok oyuncunun Caliban'a "canavar" dediğini görürüz. Bunun sebebi Shakespeare'in Caliban'ı gerçek bir canavar olarak görmesinden çok, (oyun içinde buna yönelik sağlam bir kanıt olmamasına rağmen) Caliban'ın fiziksel bir deformasyonu olması olabilir veya aslında bir insan olan Caliban, "vahşiliği," "geri kalmışlığı" ve "ötekiliği" nedeniyle canavarlaştırılmıştır.

Edebiyattaki yorumlamalarına kıyasla Caliban görsel sanatlarda daha sık bir şekilde hayvansı/canavarımsı olarak tahayyül edilmiştir. On yedinci yüzyıldan bugüne çeşitli resimlere konu olmuş Caliban karakterinin görsel gelişimini inceleyen Alden T. Vaughan ve Virginia Mason Vaughan'a göre Caliban hemen hemen hiçbir dönemde tam bir insan olarak resmedilmemiştir (daha ayrıntılı bilgi için bkz. "Artists Rendition" başlıklı bölüm). Caliban, perde ayaklı, aşırı tüylü, kara derili, genellikle yarı çıplak, yarı insan-yarı hayvan olarak resmedildiği kadar, kaplumbağa, balık, goril, sürüngen, amfibi gibi farklı hayvan şekillerinde de karşımıza çıkar. Özellikle Darwin kuramının en popüler olduğu 1850'lerde gorilimsi bir görüntüsü olan Caliban henüz gelişim evresini tamamlamamış bir insandır.

Kısacası, Shakespeare'in zamanında ötekiyi temsil eden her coğrafya, etnik kimlik, marjinallik, bu esrarengiz karakterde vücut bulmuştur ve işte tam da bu yüzden bugün Caliban farklı kültürlerde ezilenlerin sembolü olma potansiyelini korur. Shakespeare'i ölümsüz ve evrensel yapan bu ilham verici muğlaklık olmasaydı, Caliban'ı Karayipli, Latin Amerikalı, Ortadoğulu, Afrikalı olarak yorumlayan pek çok değişik ve bir o kadar da orijinal yorumla karşılaşmamız mümkün olmayacaktı bugün. Yazımın geri kalan kısmında Caliban karakterinin yirminci yüzyıl yazar ve eleştirmenleri tarafından nasıl bir isyan figürü olarak kullanıldığına ve edebiyat eleştirisinde yirminci yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren öne çıkan postkolonyalizm çalışmalarındaki önemine değinmek istiyorum.

Önceki yüzyıllara kıyasla yirminci yüzyılın ikinci yarısından sonra Caliban'ın yeniden yorumlanmasında dikkat çekici farklılıklar bulunmaktadır. On yedinci ve on sekizinci yüzyıllarda Caliban'ın "vahşi"liğinden çok "ahlaksızlığı," "hayvansılığı" ve "biçimsizliği" biraz da ibret resmi gibi vurgulanırken, aydınlanma felsefesinin değerlerini ve özellikle de "aklı" temsil eden Prospero Caliban'dan çok daha ön planda bir karakter olmuştur.[14] On dokuzuncu yüzyılın başlarında ortaya çıkan romantik hareketin etkisiyle

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[13]   W. Shakespeare, (1611). *Fırtına*, çev. Bülent Bozkurt (İstanbul: Remzi, 1994), 32.

[14]   Alden T. Vaughan ve Virginia Mason Vaughan. *Shakespeare's Caliban: A Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991), xxii.

Caliban'ın 'doğallığı' övülecek, sempati duyulacak bir özellik olarak görülmeye başlanmış, doğa güzelliklerine duyarlılığı ve doğanın sesine kulak vermesi, toplum kurallarından bağımsız hareket etmesi, kendine has bir dil kullanması, düzene baş kaldırması gibi özellikleri Caliban'ı medeni insanlardan daha cezbedici, daha güçlü, daha değerli, daha sıra dışı bir varlık yapmıştır romantiklerin gözünde. On dokuzuncu yüzyıl ve yirminci yüzyıl başlarında "biçimsizliği" yerine vurgulanan "vahşiliği" olmuştur Caliban'ın. Bu vahşilik romantikler tarafından olumlu bir özellik olarak karşılanırken, on dokuzuncu yüzyıl sonlarında Viktorya Çağı'nda ise Caliban gelişim evresini tamamlamamış bir insan olarak ıslah edilebilir bir vahşi olarak görülmüştür. Önceki yüzyıllarda Caliban daha hayvani bir varlık olarak görülürken, on dokuzuncu yüzyıldan sonra bir canavardan çok vahşi bir insan olarak görülmeye başlanmıştır.

Caliban'ın "köleliği"nin ön plana çıkması; yani, üçüncü dünyanın, bütün mazlum milletlerin ve emperyalist düzenin mağdurlarının sembolü olarak görülmesi, pek çok sömürgenin bağımsızlık mücadelesi verdiği yirminci yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren başlar. Bu dönemde artık Prospero aydınlanmacı filozof değil bir despot olarak yorumlanır.[15] Shakespeare'in oyununu postkolonyalizm çalışmaları için önemli yapan oyundaki tek ilişki Prospero-Caliban çatışması değildir: öyle olsaydı, oyun aslında çok daha çetrefilli bir travmatik olay olan sömürgeciliği basitleştiriyor olurdu. Oyundaki diğer karakterler, özellikle de Ariel ve Stephano/Trinculo ikilisi sömürgeciliğin türlü çelişkilerini gözler önüne serer. Köle olmasına rağmen yakında özgürlüğüne kavuşacak olan Ariel, Prospero'ya başkaldırmak yerine O'nunla işbirliği yapar. Caliban'ın militanlığına karşı mesafelidir. Caliban'dan daha "eğitimli," "zeki," "ahlaklı" olması nedeniyle kimi eleştirmenlere göre Ariel, sömürge halkının işbirlikçi aydınlarını temsil eder. Shakespeare'in oyunundan ilham alan Martinikli yazar Aimé Césaire'in 1969 yılında Fransızca olarak yazdığı *Bir Fırtına* ("Une Tempête") adlı oyunda Caliban siyahi bir yerliyken, Ariel melez bir yerli (mulatto slave) olarak beyazlar ve siyahlar arasında kalmış, beyazlarla işbirliği yapan entelektüel kesimi temsil eder.

Caliban'ın Kralın kâhyası Stephano ve soytarısı Trinculo ile karşılaşması, Prospero ile ilişkisinin bir nevi karikatürleştirilmesidir ve sömürgeciliğin kendini tekrar eden yapısını kara mizah yoluyla seyirciye aktarır. Stephano ve Trinculo'nun verdiği "kutsal içki" ile tanışınca onları Tanrı olarak görmeye başlayan Caliban, tıpkı Kızılderililerin Avrupalı keşifçilere yaptığı gibi değerli bulduğu her şeyi cömertçe paylaşmayı önerir:

> Adanın bereketli köşelerini karış karış gösteririm sana; / Ayağını öpeyim, ne olur benim ilahım ol! […] En güzel pınarları gösteririm

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15   Ibid., 279-281.

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sana; böğürtlen toplarım; / Balık tutarım, istediğin kadar odun getiririm. / Şimdiki efendimin de Allah belasını versin! / Odun modun yok artık ona; / Seninle geliyorum ben ey harika insan! […] Ban, Ban, Ca – Caliban, Yeni efendi buldu Caliban, /Eskisinin işi yaman! / Kurtuldum ya, nay na na nay, / Kurtuldum ya, kurtuldum ya, kurtuldum ya, / Nay na na nay.[16]

Yirminci yüzyıl eleştirmenlerinin, sömürgeci Prospero ve sömürülen Caliban arasındaki ilişkiyi tartışmak için *Fırtına*'da en çok üzerinde durdukları bölüm, oyunun başlarında geçen aşağıdaki diyalogdur:

Caliban: Bu ada annem Sycorax'tan bana kalmıştı; / Sen elimden aldın. Buraya ilk geldiğinde / Beni okşar, üstüme titrerdin, / Suda böğürtlen yıkar verirdin; / Gündüz ve gece yanan / Büyük ışığa ne denir, küçük ışığa ne denir, / Öğretirdin. Ben de seni sevmiştim; / Adada ne varsa göstermiştim sana: / Berrak pınarları, acı su çukurlarını, / Verimli ve çorak yerleri hep göstermiştim. / Göstermez olaydım! Sycorax'ın tüm afsunları, / Kurbağalar, böcekler, yarasalar üstüne yağsın. / Benden başka kulun yok burada; Oysa ben, kendimin tek kralıydım. Ama şimdi, / Beni bu ahır gibi kaya deliğine tıktın, / Adanın başka hiçbir yerine bırakmıyorsun.

(…)

Prospero: İğrenç köle, / Kötülükle öyle donanmışsın ki, / İyilik damgası tutmuyor üstünde. / Sana acımıştım; elimden geleni yapmıştım / Konuşturabilmek için seni; / Her saat yeni bir şey öğretmiştim. / Sen ki, vahşi yaratık, / Kendi söylediğini anlamazdın bir zamanlar, / Hayvanlar gibi geveler dururdun. / Aklındakini anlatabilesin diye / Kelimeler verdim ben sana. / Ama öğrendiklerin hep boşa gitti; / Öyle bir hainlik varmış ki soyunda, / İyilikten anlamadın bir türlü. / Bu yüzden de, bu kayaya kapatılmayı hak etmiştin; / Hatta hapisten çok fazlasına layıktın aslında.

Caliban: Tamam, bana konuşmayı öğrettin; peki kazancım ne? / Küfür etmesini biliyorum artık! / Kızıl veba çarpsın seni / Bana dilinizi öğrettiğin için.[17]

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16   W. Shakespeare, (1611). *Fırtına*, çev. Bülent Bozkurt (İstanbul: Remzi, 1994), 69-71.

17   Ibid., 35-36.

"Kendi" adasından yoksun bırakılan Caliban'ın tarihi Shakespeare'in zamanından günümüze haksızlığa uğrayan, yerinden yurdundan edilen, insan gücü ve doğal kaynakları sömürülen, kendi dilini unutup yabancı bir dili konuşmaya ve yabancı bir kültürün değerlerini benimsemeye zorlanan ve bütün bunlara rağmen "iflah olmaz," "nankör" diye suçlanan yerli halkların tarihidir. Kübalı eleştirmen Roberto Fernández Retamar, İspanyolca olarak yazdığı ve sonra İngilizceye çevrilen *Caliban* adlı inceleme kitabında Latin Amerika tarihi ile ilgili olarak "Bizim tarihimiz ve kültürümüz, Caliban'ın tarihi ve kültürü değildir de nedir?" der.[18]

Retamar'ın çağdaşı olan Aimé Césaire, 1930'larda siyahiliğin tarihi ve kültürünü ön plana çıkarma amacı taşıyan "siyah hareket"in ("negritude movement") bir öncüsü olarak Retamar ile benzer çizgide yazılar yazmıştır. *Bir Fırtına* adlı oyununda Césaire'in Caliban'ı hem Afrika'daki bağımsızlık mücadelesine hem de Amerika'daki Sivil Haklar Hareketi'ne (Civil Rights Movement) gönderme yapar. Caliban sahneye "Uhuru" nidasıyla girer.[19] Öte yandan, gerçek ismini reddederek isminin X olduğunu söyler: X bir yandan kimliksizliğe (veya kimliğin yok edilişine) işaret ederken, bir yandan da 1960'larda siyah militan hareketin öncülerinden Malcolm X'e açık bir referanstır.

Caliban'ın isyanının devrimci olduğu kadar sömüren kültüre müdahale eden, dönüştüren gücü postkolonyalizm çalışmalarında ön plan çıkmıştır. Yerli kültürün zenginliği, yepyeni bir melez dil ve kültür yaratma potansiyeli tartışılır. 1956'da yayımlanan *Prospero ve Kaliban: Kolonileşmenin Psikolojisi* adlı kitapta Fransız psikanalist Octave Mannoni, Prospero ve Caliban arasındaki sömürgeci-sömürülen kimliğinin bu iki kültürün "doğa"sında olduğunu savunuyordu. Mannoni'ye göre güç peşinde olan, rekabetçi Prosperolar, "bağımlılık kompleksi" olan Caliban'ları bulur ve ortaya sömürgecilik çıkar. Her ne kadar Prospero'yu despot ve Caliban'ı sömürülen yerli olarak görseler de, Martinikli düşünür Frantz Fanon ve Barbadoslu yazar Kamau Brathwaite gibi isimler bu yaklaşımda yerli kültürün sömürgeci kültüre bağımlı bir taklit kültürü ve sabit bir değişmeyen olarak görülmesine karşı çıkmışlardır.

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[18] Kitabın İngilizce çevirisinin önsözünde ünlü eleştirmen Fredric Jameson, Retamar'ın kitabının Latin Amerika kültürünü inceleyişi ile Edward Said'in Doğu-Batı ilişkisini benzer bir şekilde inceleyen ve postkolonyalizm alanında öncülük yapan eseri *Şarkiyatçılık* ("Orientalism") arasında paralellik kurar.

[19] Swahili dilinde "özgürlük" anlamına gelen bu kelime Kenya'nın 1963'te bağımsızlığını kazanmasına ilk adım olarak görülen Mau Mau Hareketi ile özdeşleşmiştir ve sonrasında pek çok bağımsız mücadelesinde kullanılan evrensel bir kelime haline gelmiştir.

Ayrıca Mannoni'nin savunduğu "bağımlılık kompleksi" yüzyıllardır yerli dilleri "tuhaf" ve "anlaşılmaz", yerli halkı "konuşma özürlü"[20], yerli kültürü yok veya eksik sayan sömürgeci zihniyetinin bir parçası olma riski taşır. Bu nedenle Frantz Fanon 1952'de yazdığı *Siyah Deri, Beyaz Maskeler* adlı çığır açıcı kitabının önsözünde Mannoni'nin teorisini "tehlikeli" bulduğunu söyler. Fanon ve diğer pek çok yazar ve düşünür, yerli kültürün sömürge kültürünü, özellikle de sömürge dilini nasıl altüst ettiğini, kendi kültürüne adapte ettiğini incelerler. Yani taklit bir nevi başkaldırıyı da içinde barındırabilir.

Barbadoslu şair ve akademisyen Kamau Brathwaite eserlerinde Karayip kültürü ve dilini tartışmıştır. Adada konuşulan "creole English" İngilizcenin yerli dillerle ve diğer sömürge dilleriyle karışarak "yerlileştirilmiş" halidir. Ne tam Afrikalı ne de tam Avrupalı olan bu dil, İspanyolca, Fransızca, Hollandaca gibi hâkim dilleri de etkiler, dönüştürür:[21]

> Ulusal dilimiz Afrika modelinden, Yeni Dünya/Karayip mirasının Afrika tarafından güçlü bir şekilde etkilenmiş bir dildir. Kullanılan sözcükler (lexicon) İngilizce'dir ama sözdizimi (syntax) açısından İngilizce değildir. Ve ritim, ses tınısı, kendine has ses patlaması açısından şüphesiz İngilizce değildir. Ulusal dil İngilizce olabilir ama daha çok bir uluma, bir haykırış, bir makineli tüfek, veya rüzgâr, dalga gibi bir İngilizce'dir. Blues'a da benzer. Ve bazen aynı zamanda hem İngilizce hem Afrikaca'dır.
>
> Şimdi size ulusal dilimizin özelliklerini tarif etmek istiyorum. Öncelikle, bahsettiğim gibi, sözlü kültür kaynaklıdır. Şiir, kültürün kendisi, bir sözlükte değil, söylenen sözde bulunur. Sese olduğu kadar şarkılara da dayanır. Yani, dilin yaptığı gürültü anlamın bir parçasıdır ve gürültüyü (ya da sizin gürültü olarak algılayabileceğinizi diyeyim) göz ardı ederseniz anlamın bir kısmını kaçırırsınız. [Ulusal dilimiz] yazıldığında sesi ve gürültüyü duyamazsınız ve dolayısıyla anlamın bir kısmını kaçırırsınız. [22]

Mannoni'nin Caliban karakterinde gördüğü "bağımlılık kompleksi"ne karşı yerli kültürün ve dilin bağımsız yönünü vurgulayan yukarıdaki yorumların ışığında Caliban, sadece Prospero'dan dil öğrenmemiş, bu dili aynı zamanda

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[20] Stephen Greenblatt, *Learning to Curse: Essays in Early Modern Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 28.

[21] Kamau Brathwaite, "History of Voice." *Roots* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993), 259, 262.

[22] Ibid., 266.

değiştirmiş, geliştirmiştir. Hakikaten de oyunda en şiirsel konuşan karakter Caliban'dır.

Shakespeare'in "çapulcu" Caliban'ının ayaklanması, günümüzde sömürgeci-emperyalist egemen kültürün çekindiği, iktidar karşıtı ve hiyerarşik düzene tehdit olarak gördüğü ve dolayısıyla bastırmaya çalıştığı direnişçilerin isyanının bir parçasıdır. Bugün dünyada bir hayalet dolaşıyor: bütün dünya ayakta… Bugün Caliban'ların sesi dünyanın dört bir yanında çok daha güçlü çıkıyor. Bir yandan onların sesine kulak verirken bir yandan da farklılıkların gittikçe benzeşmeye zorlandığı globalleşen dünyamızda her isyanı ortaya çıkaran farklı bölgesel koşullar olduğunu göz önünde bulundurmak gerekli. Hatta aynı isyanın bir parçası olan grupların farklılığı korunabilmeli…. Bugün her Caliban birbirinden farklı bir dil konuşuyor ama çıkan ses bir "gürültü" değil.

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Tekzip / Erratum

Metafor 2018/2'de yayımlanmış olan Burcu Karadaş Can'ın "The Woman Question in *the Memoirs of a Survivor* and *Güneş Saygılı'nın Gerçek Yaşamı*" adlı makalesinin İngilizce özetinde basım hatası yapılmıştır. Düzeltir, özür dileriz.

The abstract of the article "The Woman Question in *the Memoirs of a Survivor* and *Güneş Saygılı'nın Gerçek Yaşamı*" has been printed incorrectly in *Metafor* 2018/2. We apologize for our mistake and present the correct abstract below.

The Woman Question in *The Memoirs of a Survivor* and *Güneş Saygılı'nın Gerçek Yaşamı*

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Abstract

Although *The Memoirs of a Survivor* by Doris Lessing and *The Real Life of Güneş Saygılı* by Erendiz Atasü are written in different cultural backgrounds in separate decades, they meet on common ground: both are semi-autobiographies, both take place in apocalyptic dystopias, and both authors of the novels are labelled as feminist writers. Both *Güneş Saygılı*, which details before the apocalypse, and *Memoirs*, recounting the aftermath of the catastrophe, portray the social and psychological struggles of women (and men) with regard to transforming gender roles in changing societies. In this context, the present article will attempt to reveal how gender roles and sexuality are represented in these two related novels, how these works address the woman question with regard to the radical changes in their fictional societies, and in the end will question whether they can be called as feminist texts regarding their portrayal of women and men amidst the social transformation in the stories.

Keywords: Lessing, Atasü, feminism, *Güneş Saygılı*, *Memoirs*

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